A bit of political and diplomatic initiative that emerged at a meeting of Latin American leaders in Rio de Janeiro on Friday ought to be of great interest to the heads of government of the Caribbean Community as they meet in Port of Spain this week.

The Latin American initiative, we think, offers the region a broader plane from which to engage Haiti and its interim government, headed by Mr Gerard Latortue, but with potentially fewer risks of undermining principle.

But it will be important, though, to first gauge the response to the Rio ideas by Mr Latortue and the Bush administration, which, on their records, will find, in all probability, some of the proposals not to their liking.

The Latin American leaders, it has been reported, want a programme to pour development aid into Haiti, but at the same time would like to bolster the United Nations multinational force that is in the country in an effort to prevent the country from descending further into anarchy.

On the face of it, that is not substantially different from what has been proposed by the Western troika of the United States, France and the new Canadians, who are now the important brokers in Haiti after the February coup d'etat that ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

But the Latin American initiative has one important distinction, the countries of the Rio Group plan to send a diplomat to South Africa to meet with Mr Aristide about their plan to rebuild Haiti, ensure security and advance democracy.

Although it has been made clear that Mr Aristide will not be invited to participate directly in the process, this initiative recognises that he remains a powerful and important force in Haiti and the legitimacy of his political movement Lavalas, which Mr Latortue and his supporters have sought to sideline.

Indeed, it flies in the face of the propositions that have been advanced by the Western Troika and re-endorses the logic of the Kingston Accord led by Prime Minister P J Patterson, which had the best potential for political change in Haiti within a constitutional framework.

Caricom proposed a power-sharing arrangement that would have allowed Mr Aristide to serve out his remaining two years as president.

That, ostensibly, was rejected by the formal opposition. The upshot was intensification of unrest in Haiti, increased violence by a force of irregulars and pressure on Mr Aristide by the United States, France and the new Canadians to resign.

Haiti is now perhaps more divided and unstable than before.
Mr Latortue has consistently blamed the violence in Haiti on the hidden hand of Mr Aristide and accused South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki of breaking international law for harbouring Mr Aristide.

In that context, it does not seem that any engagement of Mr Aristide by the Latin Americans, whatever the message they carry, will find favour with Latortue. It is also unlikely to sit easy with the Americans. Yet Washington may see Latin American help as broadening the burden of Haiti and a lessening of a distraction while it grapples with Iraq.

For Caricom, the Latin American initiative, in the absence of the fine print, could be a way for the Community to find its way back into Haiti with greater insulation - a kind of new start without the total abandonment of strongly held principles.

Indeed, Caricom can see the need to talk to Mr Aristide as a vindication of its own position, while it can at the same time remind of its own pragmatic position of recognising the de facto situation in Haiti after Mr Aristide's departure.

Unfortunately, Mr Latortue did not grasp the nuanced development of Caricom's policy on Haiti so he lambasted the community and crassly embraced the paramilitary thugs who were the face of the coup d'etat.

Hopefully, the Latin American initiative is what we suppose it to be. If it is, maybe someone will assign Mr Latortue a ventriloquist.

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