Professor Trevor Munroe insists that the opportunity that Jamaica now has to dismantle organised crime will be lost if we place Senator AJ Nicholson's need to construct "powerful signs" and "signal indicators" of intent ahead of the decisive and immediate steps included in the prime minister's May 17 broadcast.

Below is Munore's full response to Nicholson's criticism of his call for legislation that would suspend parliamentarians, like Kern Spencer and Joseph Hibbert, from the House while they are under investigation for alleged acts of corruption.

IN your article, 'Nicholson lashes Munroe over Golding, Spencer', my friend AJ Nicholson asks, "Would the resignation of the prime minister not be a powerful sign that Jamaica is serious about stamping out corruption, and a signal indicator that we intend to reverse the trend along which Jamaica now moves on the narco- and rouge-state radar? What say you, Professor?" Well, allow me to say the following in response:

Firstly, perhaps Golding's resignation would be "a powerful sign" about being "serious" and a "signal indicator" of intention. These are no doubt important. I suggest that more important for Jamaica right now, however, than a "sign" of seriousness and an "indicator" of future intention is actual seriousness here and now, expressed in decisive and immediate steps to disrupt and defeat organised crime, its enslavement of garrison communities and, very importantly, its relations with the upper world of politicians on both sides, of private sector 'sponsors', real estate developers, civil society 'professionals', of corrupt public servants, etc. In this regard, Jamaica cannot afford to lose another moment nor allow single-minded focus to be deflected from immediate action to:

1. Extend the State of Emergency (with whatever material and resource support is required from our international partners) and upgrade assistance to the security forces in apprehending 'Dudus' Coke and other fugitives. One suggestion I would make is for the private sector to take the lead in a public mobilisation to triple the US$20,000 reward now being offered for Coke's capture.

2. Confiscate the assets of 'Dudus' Coke and as many leaders of organised crime (JLP-connected, PNP-connected, or independent) in relation to whom asset "civil recovery orders" can be placed before the Court. The Financial Investigation Division needs to speed up its work in preparing these orders and provided with whatever additional resources may be needed to speed up the process.

3. Terminate existing contracts, not just from the public sector but from the private sector as well, to front companies, enterprises, and activities connected to organised crime.

4. Place a stop order on any current or pending contracts and sub-contracts to these mafia-type entities, for example in the repair of the Coronation Market, redevelopment of Downtown Kingston or in contract awards in current talk about 'post-conflict' reconstruction.

5. Immediately begin to subject all 2,000 contractors, starting with 'suspect entities', registered with the National Contracts Commission to "Fit and Proper" tests, supervised by the security force high command. Deregister any of these where credible intelligence reports indicate on 'a balance of probability' links to organised crime and asset-acquisition on the basis of unlawful activity.

6. Develop policy, give drafting instructions, prepare a bill to place before the Parliament and pass legislation to criminalise persons with beneficial associations with or who derive advantage from relations with organised crime.

7. Place before the Parliament, pass and Gazette before the Summer recess a bill to require the registration of political parties, the publication of accounts, the disclosure of sources of funding and the provision of defined public funding.

Secondly, a real opportunity to accomplish these actions now exists not primarily because of Prime Minister Golding's intentions, but largely because of public pressure through an unprecedented coalition of Jamaican organisations and international partners, developed over nine months, which put an end to what Nicholson describes, with much justification, as "the Head of Government's nine-month, outrageous, history-making assault on the rule of law in Jamaica". If this kind of 'history-making' is not to resume, the coalition and the public pressure which brought us here must not only be maintained, it must be strengthened. It must keep its eye on the ball -- namely, the opportunity to disconnect organised crime from politics and to open up the garrison zones of exclusion -- not least of all to freedom of movement in and out, and shut down the 'torture chambers' wherever they are found.

Thirdly, neither AJ nor I nor any other Jamaican interested in the transformation of our system of governance should be allowed to forget how many times in the past we have allowed windows of opportunity to close. One critical reason is that each time the national and international coalition for transformation has allowed itself to take its "eye off the ball" by otherwise legitimate concerns. The moment we take our eye off the ball, the beneficiaries of corruption and organised crime -- in the JLP, PNP, public sector and private sector -- get away scot-free.

For example, in October 2006, Trafigura triggered an unprecedented coalition coming together to demand political party registration and political funding disclosure legislation. Soon, however, general elections campaigning intervened, distracted us from keeping our eye on the ball, the coalition withered away, the window closed and to date, no action.

As a result, in 2010, because we lost focus, because we took our eye off the party finance disclosure ball, today no Jamaican knows who in the private sector getting multi-million dollar tax waivers or Government contracts are getting them not on merit but in return for party donations. Another example -- 1995. Both the PNP and the JLP parliamentarians signed off in the Constitutional Reform Joint Select Committee on concrete proposals for impeachment of public officials, including prime ministers. Had these proposals been implemented PM Golding would, as I have said publicly, properly have been the subject of impeachment, not just a "no-confidence" motion. Why don't we have an impeachment mechanism today? Again election campaigning intervened in 1997 to take our eye off the ball of impeachment and provisions of constitutional reform.

Fourthly, are Nicholson and other persons of goodwill who share justifiable outrage at Golding's conduct suggesting that "the powerful sign" and "signal indicator" of a Golding resignation would not run the risk of yet again losing national focus on the main thing or taking our eye off the ball of decisive action? Are they saying that the internal tug o' war, the 'bangarang' inside the JLP which would then follow to choose a leader would keep JLP people and Jamaica focused on action against organised crime?

Are they saying that if the JLP refused to accept Golding's resignation, as they did, and the coalition reoriented its energies -- as it would have to do if sending this 'sign' was the priority above all else to insist that the Government resign -- that the ensuing general election campaign would keep us focused on actions to disrupt organised crime? Or alternately, is it being argued that the "powerful sign" of Golding's voluntary or enforced resignation is more important than real, measurable and possible advance against state capture if, as is apparent, both cannot be achieved simultaneously?

Fifthly, despite what AJ and others may think, I hold no brief for Golding. What I have said and I now repeat is that because of the unprecedented pressure from the international national coalition he has had to reverse himself and is in fact now presiding over an opportunity for Jamaica to make advances against the monster of organised crime such as not happened under any previous prime minister. But this opportunity can and will be lost if we place AJ's need to construct "powerful signs" and "signal indicators" of intent ahead of the decisive and immediate steps set out above and included in the prime ninister's May 17 broadcast.

We need a statement to Parliament next week (already more than a month after the speech), no later, from the prime minister setting out the timelines and we must hold him to IMF-type account for deliverables. What I said publicly (following on the US request for Coke's extradition) from September 2009 up to May 2010, almost every morning on the Breakfast Club and elsewhere on a weekly basis is what I have said privately to the prime minister. It is this, as The Gleaner correctly quoted me, on the day of the prime minister's May 17 volte face public apology broadcast :

"Nothing less than a sincere and unconditional apology from the prime minister and, secondly, a signing of the authority to proceed with the extradition, and thirdly, an action plan within a defined period to begin to degarrison the society, disconnect organised gangs from political parties and disclose the funding sources of political parties" were Munroe's demands.[The Jamaica Gleaner, May 17, 2010, 'Tarnished for Life' by Gary Spaulding]

Golding's history, distrust of his leadership, lack of confidence in his intention -- all of this remains in the minds of many of our people and is important. I do insist, however, that, of greater importance for Jamaica at this specific moment is for the coalition -- national and international -- to step up the pressure, maintain focus and seize the opportunity that we now have, perhaps for the first time since independence, to effect decisive action against organised crime and to strengthen accountability mechanisms in governance.

Provision for impeachment is one such mechanism -- a far more powerful deterrent to abuse of public trust by any future prime minister than the precedent of a Golding resignation. AJ and others should ask themselves how much of a deterrent to subsequent abuse of official power have past ministerial resignations arising from public pressure been?

Finally, consider whether the South African people's anti-apartheid coalition would have lost momentum or even lost a historic opportunity to dismantle apartheid if in the early 1990s they had allowed their focus on dismantling apartheid to be deflected on President de Klerk's role as an architect and beneficiary of apartheid and not on his potential, forced by circumstances no doubt, to become a partner of Mandela in its dismantlement.

Today, Golding's fate, whether politically dead or resurrected, is in his own hands, in the hands of the JLP and of the Jamaican people. I fully understand and respect the feelings of those who call for his resignation. However, I have to respectfully reject the sixth form debating point that I am sending "mixed signals" by not equating the suspension of Spencer -- charged and on trial for serious breach of the Corruption Prevention Act -- and Hibbert -- in relation to whom a recommendation for prosecution from the contractor general is now before the DPP (neither of whom have admitted wrong, apologised, nor asked forgiveness ) -- with the resignation of Golding, neither charged nor about to be charged, as far as I am aware, with any criminal offence. The moreso when Golding's removal, in current circumstances, would undoubtedly deflect focus and weaken the momentum in the drive against organised crime.

  7 comments

  7 comments

  0 comments

  7 comments

  0 comments

  5 comments

  0 comments

  2 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments

  0 comments