One-day last week, US Ambassador Sue Cobb sat for two hours with the Observer’s editor-in-chief, Paget deFreitas, for an interview that explored issues ranging from the Bush administration’s case for war in Iraq and America’s commitment to multilateralism to Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s claim that he was kidnapped and shunted out of Haiti and a perception among some of rising anti-Americanism in Iraq.

Cobb held a consistent theme: that eventually, President Bush will be vindicated for his action against Saddam Hussein and the substance of the Bush presidency. The full interview follows:

PD: I know that you are not going anywhere shortly. At least not for a few months. But after three years in Jamaica, and you were to do an accounting of those three years, how would you assess them?

SC: Well, that is precisely one area that I am not going to address, because I have more time to be here and I don’t want to be in the mode of assessing the past three years and attributing successes or failures or areas of improvement. I think that is better left for another time when I am departing the country, which isn’t in the next few months.

PD: When you were coming here what was the mandate? What were the briefs?

SC: The briefs were long and involved… The mandate is to preserve, protect and enhance bilateral relations. That is what any US ambassador is assigned to do. And to maintain the dialogue that goes back and forth at diplomatic level between sovereign nations.

PD: There must have been some specificity to this mandate. Look at all those Anti-Americans down there.

SC: No, No! That would be the wrong way to frame it. I really do. First of all you are asking me what was the mandate essentially in 2001. I knew I was going to be coming down here in quite early 2001. And as you might be able to appreciate, it was a new administration coming in to formulate their positions on an entire world. So I truly cannot tell that there was a specific charge as to what one does in Jamaica or in the Caribbean. There was a great deal of discussion at the time on the Western Hemisphere as you may recall – the importance of the Western Hemisphere to President Bush and to the administration and to the United States. We focused a lot on that and how we might go about it. In the beginning, and prior to my arrival here, we hadn’t had the Quebec Summit so there had been no meeting of leaders, there had been no third border initiative announcement. It was focus on paying attention to the Western Hemisphere in general. Now, everyone knows what happened in September. The administration had hardly settled in when the spectre of terrorist activities arose and to our shock and horror September 11 happened. That, of course, changed focus, changed the dynamics. It didn’t change the belief on the part of the president and his administration of the importance of the Western Hemisphere, but it certainly changed both the timing and the capability of demonstrating that interest in the Western Hemisphere. And frankly, after 9/11 it was largely for those ambassadors that were not directly involved in the matters concerning that tragedy in the countries who were possibly implicated. we were largely to figure out on our own what the next steps were.

PD: What, for you, were the next steps?

SC: I don’t want to do an entire retrospective here, but I certainly recall that the first people who called me in Jamaica were the prime minister and the foreign minister to express their condolences on the action that had taken place.

It wouldn’t be so important to somebody who was not in my position, but that day, September 11, was the first day I was meeting with my own country team. I didn’t even know my own officials in this embassy at that point in time. But that morning following those events I was called by the leaders of this country who expressed their great sympathy for the events at the twin Trade Towers and that certainly impressed me.

Then, I think for the period for the next couple of months it was just all of us staggering through what we can do, what we could and should do, where we were going to go at the time. Because the world changed. We knew it, We knew it at the time. If you saw a television that morning, which many Jamaicans did and so many Americans did, and when we actually saw those planes flying into the towers YOU KNEW THAT THE WORLD HAD CHANGED.

PD: And you thought that expression of support was genuine?

SC: No question at all. Not only did I think that at the time, I still think so. It has not changed at all. It was a tremendous expression of sympathy at the time. First by the leadership, then by the Jamaican people. People called, they wrote, came to the embassy. Father Albert had a service at Stella Maris a few days later and there was a tremendous outpouring of people. That essentially set the tone for my engagement in Jamaica, telling me these were warm and kind neighbours.

Now, I did not feel anywhere, anytime a sense of anti-Americanism. There is a considerable question now. I am still back in 2001. And as we move forward, I would say that in 2004, for the first time, other than the critics in the print media, and on the air on occasions, criticising the United States, apart from those people who make it their job to be critical, I had never heard from an American tourist a feeling of anti-American sentiment until earlier this year.

Much to my disappointment, even travelling last weekend to a hotel near Montego Bay, Americans are saying, ‘What is going on here? We look at the newspapers and we feel that it is anti-American’. That is very, very disappointing. Very disappointing. But I can understand it. If you think of it from a tourist perspective, tourists, typically, don’t listen to radio commentary. They read the morning newspapers. They are here on weekends. A large part of the Jamaican print media on the weekend has columnists attacking the United States for one thing or another. That’s what the American tourist sees.

PD: I don’t sense that what is written by Jamaican columnists is substantially different from what is being written in lots of other places by thinkers and columnists. What is it that has changed, over that three-year period, so that perspectives about the United States have changed?

SC: I think it is really quite clear. First of all, nobody wants war of any kind. Everybody would like to have the world being fully at peace at all times. And we understand that. So first we had the conflict in Afghanistan, then the conflict in Iraq and an unstable situation in Iraq. Over that has created more…

I am not saying that there is a change in the thought process of the writers from three years ago. But it was not that high a volume or sometimes vitriolic personal attack, which I like to think most of the media would stay above, but it doesn’t always happen. It has just gotten stronger, and I think the latter is solely related to the situation in Iraq.

Often people will say they are not anti-American, but they are anti-Bush. They will say that. That’s understandable. There are people in the United States who say that also. However, it is not said in a thoughtful way.

PD: The poll numbers show that Mr Bush is possibly the most polarising president in US history. And he is.

SC: I don’t know, because I don’t know of the polls of all the presidents that have preceded him. However, there is no question that the voters in the United States are pretty much split. And reasonably strongly split. However, I would say two things about that. One is, it has been a particularly difficult time recently in our Iraqi situation, which has been improving – fortunately. But it has been bad. We had the awful, awful situation with the prison, Abu Ghraib. We have repetitive demonstrations of the loss of American life which we all truly regret. There is nothing exciting about getting on television and defending the reasons why the United States went to Iraq. What the war on terrorism needs and what the wider picture is with regard to the entire broader Middle East and the world- that is not something that goes into a five-minute commentary.

PD: What is your understanding of why the United States went into Iraq?

SC: My understanding of why the United States went into Iraq was to remove a terrorist threat. Not only to the United States, but to the world. Nobody could argue that Saddam Hussein did not pose a threat.

You can parse it several different ways. But when you look at that leader’s history it is a complete rebuff of the international efforts to make sure that he was no longer a threat in any way. A complete rebuff, complete and total rebuff of the United Nations.

And you look at his history and you look at the oppression of the people of Iraq, the administration felt that there was a strong case that the world would be a better place without him.

Nobody was going to do it. Nobody was going to do it. We were going back to the United Nations year after year after year, resolution after resolution after resolution.

PD: So the assumption is that the United States needs to use its power and to eschew multilateral processes once it feels that its power is for the good of the rest.

SC: You might reach that conclusion. That is your statement. I don’t believe that is accurate at all. Because in fact, the United States went to the United Nations, went to the United Nations before any of this developed – sought to see if the United Nations would enforce its resolutions, went back immediately before. while preparing. to go into Iraq, went back to the United Nations and could not generate sufficient engagement at the United Nations to enforce the resolutions. It didn’t happen.

PD: There is a sense that the grounds are quite slippery in terms of the argument that the United States has put forward or the rationale the United States has made for entering into Iraq. Weapons of mass destruction versus…

SC: Right! That’s the easiest argument to make – weapons of mass destruction because we thought that they were there. The president, and the secretary of state did receive some misinformation. We knew they were there, we know there were some. while we were there. There were not the stockpiles that we thought. They were not there. There were bits and pieces.

We know that they were developing – There was plenty information on plans and data and that kind of thing. But that was the easy case to make – weapons of mass destruction. It turned out to be wrong. There was not the stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, but there was a capability. There was previous use, a potential of transferring technology, there was a potential for transferring knowledge. It is not one thing, but an accumulation of.

PD: But ultimately, it is a furtherance of an ideology. An ideology that says regime change is a plausible way to promote foreign policy.

SC: No. I think that it is a common term that is used and has caught on among the intelligentsia. The way I see it is somewhat different. I see it is a word that has also caught on, but is not really that great, but it is more accurate. It is pre-emption. You don’t wait for somebody to attack you if you feel that it is a very strong chance that it could happen – if you feel that you’re going to be damaged and that your security is going to be damaged.

These policies, by the way, came from the Clinton administration. This was not new in the Bush administration. It was further articulated in President Bush’s national strategic policy in early 2000. It was articulated in a manner that caught more attention. But it was actually started by the Clinton administration.

PD: Is the ascendancy of the Defence Department over the State Department, the ascendancy of the formulation of war over dialogue and diplomacy?

SC: It can appear that way. Before you go there, let me continue a little more on pre-emption. One of the key things on pre-emption is that it has been, through the history of mankind, in conflicts. There is offence and defence. And sometimes you do one first, sometimes the other first.. Pre-emption is something historically used by battle commanders, foreign ministers and game show hosts, etc.

PD: You would articulate it as a credible foreign policy process?

SC: Absolutely. Particularly as foreign policies relate to security of the nation. Absolutely. It is absolutely appropriate to consider pre-emption as one of your strategies in defence of your country. No question.

PD: How would you categorise yourself on the spectrum of the ideological debate in the United States?

SC: That is not a characterisation that I would make. I am the ambassador of the United States, which means that I represent the president, the existing foreign policy, and the people of the United States. We are not, as ambassadors, taking political positions. Even though I am a presidential appointee, as all foreign service officers are, in your country and mine, designated to defend the positions of their governments. That’s my position. That’s where I am. It doesn’t matter personally what I tell you about where I am on the spectrum on some political ground.

PD: Clearly. But you are not distanced from the Republican Party or President Bush?

SC: No. Can’t be.

PD: I mean in your personal political background and concepts and processes over time.

SC: I would defend President Bush and our country and our processes in any way I can.

PD: Would you feel more kindred with President Bush than say, with Mr Kerry ?

SC: It is irrelevant about what I feel. It is really irrelevant about what I feel. I represent the United States and I represent the policies that our country puts forward. People can look at one’s history and one’s relationships and make their own decisions. My position is that I represent the United States and I will continue to do that to the best of my ability, whomever I am reporting to at the time.

PD: Do you think that this has been a very thoughtful presidency?

SC: Absolutely! And this is the point that people haven’t looked at yet. In my honest judgement, 30 years from now, or 20 years from now, people are going to look back at the changes that happened. First as the Cold War unfolded and then at the point of 9/11 forward. And they are going to see the transformation, in other places in the world, that happened in the Western Hemisphere in the 1980s where dictators and autocrats gave way to some form of democratic governance. It happened in every single country in the Western Hemisphere, except one.

PD: There was a sort of hemispheric consensus around change in the 80s and early 90s. But this was possibly the most divisive period in US relations, not just with the hemisphere, but with the rest of the world… possibly in US history.

SC: The one thing that I think that has really changed the equation, changed the equation entirely, is the whole impact of globalisation. And that is not something that the US has imposed on anybody. That is something that has arisen and which has had a tremendous impact on everybody primarily, partially by creed, partially by ability of movement of people, partially by ability of movement of money and assets – but mostly by the ability to communicate in massive ways, to areas of the earth that have never been reached before. That’s my opinion. The impact of the spread of knowledge, of the forces of globalisation through these computer technologies – it has changed the world so dramatically. It is like nothing we have ever seen before.

PD: Some might argue that while globalisation is a very relevant issue, there is a more over-arching issue of a style of a presidency, an over-reaching ideology that celebrates the assertion of power.

SC: The over-arching principles of the administration really relate to spreading democracy, human rights and liberty. Those are the fundamental values that this president holds very, very dearly. This president is not someone who makes his decisions based on either waiting for the next poll or waiting for the consensus to develop. He feels that it is important to take action when the time is proper to take action. He is not afraid to do so because he does not forego opportunities when a difference can be made in the world that can benefit mankind. I know that is his thinking. I know that nobody believes that at the moment. We will see 20 years from now.

PD: Can a system of global governance endure in that kind of environment where this multilateral process is sidelined at times?

SC: First of all, understand that we strongly believe in the multilateral process. We really do. I know that some people don’t think that’s true, but it is true. The multilateral process has to be effective. Things have to be able to be discussed, agreed upon and achieved. Or it doesn’t work. And that is what happened in the one instance of Iraq and the United Nations.

We, the United States, very much value our multilateral relations. We are extremely pleased to be working with the OAS, for example. We are very supportive of Caricom’s efforts in its drive to put together the CSME and achieve multilateralism within the region. That’s quite appropriate. We are quite happy to join and be a part of every multilateral organisation that (a) doesn’t impact our security and (b) actually can accomplish its goals that it set about to achieve. We are not willing to be members of conversational clubs.

PD: Where does that leave small states, such as Jamaica, that believe that it is necessary to have these conversational clubs where ideas are thought through and a consensus arrived at. Everybody is not going to be the sole super-power.

SC: That’s right. Everybody is going to take care of their own interest. I certainly wouldn’t want to say that we don’t want to be part of dialogue. When I refer to conversational clubs, I mean those who do nothing, who get nothing done.

That’s not the case with a large number of organisations… To come back to your specific question, as an observation, every country has to do what it thinks is in its best interest. And what it appears to me that Jamaica is doing with the rest of its Caribbean colleagues is working together to form a stronger unit to influence the decision-making in the larger multilateral bodies – very appropriate approach.

PD: In that regard, of this broad multilateral approach – Kyoto and the International Criminal Court. Do they speak to an engagement of the multilateral process?

SC: Yes. Let’s use another example. Let’s use an example of the International Seabed Authority and the Law of the Sea. The United States for years did not join that because the United States did not feel it was in their best international interest to do so. Every country, as you know, will make decisions that are in the best national interest. That has been evolving because we have had dialogue over the course of the last probably 10 years with the parties involved in that particular group to see how we could reach consensus, so that it would be in the United States’ national interest to ascend to that body. And we are close to achieving that.

I would say that the same could apply to any other examples that are given – whether you are talking about Kyoto. I am not so sure about the ICC, because that’s a separate thing there. But it is possible. And the reason is because we will take the position that is in the United States’ national interest. We will continue to talk with all our partners, and if we can find a common way to move forward within that organisation, we are not averse to doing that.

Our complaints on the International Criminal Court, which is a subject which we speak of periodically down here, relate as much to our concern about American soldiers, who are now on duty in a lot of places around the world, being brought into positions of punishment by other powers for reasons that might not be necessarily other than politically-motivated. Perhaps the bigger concern is that we do not feel that the ICC has established a body that has proper oversight and control. Originally, remember, we were for this and we wanted to join, and at the last minute the UN oversight was taken away and it left three persons as the ones who would make all the decisions. Which is essentially two persons, because it is majority.

We don’t feel that that is proper accountability, so we are not interested to be a part of that.

PD: Does the United States, in some respect, think that it ought not to be controlled by any authority but itself?

SC: I certainly wouldn’t phrase it that way at all. The US has been willing to submit itself on a number of occasions to control, as you put it, by an outside body. It is a matter of deciding whether there is sufficient accountability and transparency to allow the United States to accede to such conventions or organisations.

PD: How do you see US/hemispheric and US/English-speaking Caribbean relations evolving? …Take them in segments.

SC: I think they are quite different.

Let me say this. I think that almost all leaders in the western hemisphere recognise that we have a combined destiny. We have an inter-woven history and we have a future in which we are going to be entwined forever. It will be in the best interest for each of our countries to establish mutually-supportive relationships.

One of the strong efforts that the US has made in this regard, which is usually looked at cynically, but if you think it through and look at history and look at what could happen in the future…. is in the area of opening up trade. There is no question that liberalised trade raises the per capita income in every country and among all segments, from the poorest to the wealthiest. It raises incomes. Therefore it raises the economic levels of countries that are engaged in liberalised trade.

We have been talking about that, and we think we, the United States, strongly believe that our interest in that regard lies with the Western Hemisphere.

We are still hopeful that we will be able to find a way to conclude the Free Trade Area of the Americas. We have, as we move forward, made a number of free trade agreements with various countries.

We have had, I would say, a very good relationship with Caricom in working towards a free trade agreement that accommodates the concerns of the Caribbean. Perhaps the Caribbean less than the broader Western Hemisphere, but we have had a tremendous amount of dialogue, including all the discussions on special and differential treatment, and Ambassador Zoellick (the US trade representative) has specifically stated that that was a concern for us and we would take that into account.

The Regional Negotiating Machinery (Caricom’s trade negotiating arm) under Ambassador (Richard) Bernal has been working with us. There have been starts and stops and there have been things we do not fully agree on. This is true throughout the hemisphere, but just speaking in terms of the English-speaking Caribbean, we recognise that there are some unique issues that the governments have to face and we want to help the governments face those issues because it so clearly increases economic prosperity. It also, at the same time, very importantly, establishes rules by which everybody will live.

And the rules, especially relating to trade, provide a discipline that encourages economic development, and it encourages transparency because you have to have dispute resolution mechanisms. Everybody has to understand what rules they are playing by, how to settle disputes and it has to be a fully transparent operation.

We just signed the Central American Free Trade Agreement. We feel that that agreement will provide similar benefits to the five Central American countries that Canada and Mexico found under NAFTA. We are anxious to include the rest of the hemisphere in achieving the same goals and the same opportunities for development. In some ways, it can be argued that this pits the Western Hemisphere against Europe and against, perhaps, the Asian countries. The blocs in trade are now getting larger and larger.

PD: Even as the FTAA evolves and emerges, there continue to be substantial stresses. President Lula, for instance, of Brazil has raised substantive issues, and internally in the US the agricultural issues remain difficult.

SC: It is not really difficult. The concerns of President Lula and others. Let’s use G20 as an example from Cancun, with whom we couldn’t reach an accord, not solely, but primarily, on agricultural issues. On agriculture, our position is quite simple, since the Doha Round began. We would like to see all tariffs eliminated. We suggest all tariffs, everywhere, be eliminated – that doesn’t particularly help the Caribbean – and bring any export subsidies into line with whatever we can talk Europe and Japan into doing. Europe has way in excess of what the US has in export subsidies. So does Japan. Europe three times greater, Japan nearly twice as much as the United States has.

We are prepared to get rid of them, but we have to have the help of our friends to convince Japan and the European Union to do the same thing. Otherwise we put ourselves in the position of not playing on an even playing field, of having no defence against the agricultural products of the European Union and Japan.

PD: Mr Lamey argues that there is a bit of a chimera with the US proposal.

SC: Of course, they can say the opposite. If the US does not, we do it.

PD: In terms of Caricom, what is the view at State, if you were to offer advice, about how that should emerge? You have said that you are supportive of the CSME. Is there a view of how that relationship should emerge?

SC: The reason that I say the we are supportive of the CSME is first of all, there are studies that trading groups within themselves, when they liberalise trade among themselves. enhance their standard of living. These groups will also come up with the rules by which they are going to play the game. They are going to improve the processes of good governance and fair dealing by having these trade agreements while raising their standards of living. There have been a number of studies done on this.

So we believe that if the Caricom countries decide to liberalise trade among themselves, recognising that there are a number of issues that have to be dealt with – both legislative and revenue wise – we understand that. But we believe if the Caricom countries do this they automatically raise their standard of living.

PD: The CSME, as a process, suggests shared sovereignty.

SC: Let me be clear that I don’t understand every point of the CSME. I don’t want to take a position that I am taking a position of somebody ceding sovereignty. You do give up things when you make agreements, of course. You make trade-offs. But presumably there is reciprocity. I do not know all the details of it. I am talking about from the economic perspective solely.

PD: Have you ever had this conversation with Mr Seaga (the Jamaican opposition leader who has questioned Jamaica’s deepening relationship with Caricom and the CSME)? Do you think it is possible?

SC: No, I have not.

PD: You would have had, if it was possible.

SC: I’m sure it’s possible. I don’t think we would necessarily agree on everything as I understand it. We have never discussed it. I don’t know which elements he thinks are appropriate and which are not. I certainly know that Mr Seaga and his party are for economic development.

This is not a wholesale support of a PNP (Jamaica’s ruling People’s National Party) position. This is a support of an economic concept which makes sense from a historical perspective.

PD: We have just had the departure of Mr Aristide to South Africa. That episode has been a source of tension between Jamaica and the United States. Was the United States wrong?

SC: No. . I don’t think that it is really a good idea to think in terms of who is right and who is wrong. I think it is appropriate to think in terms of what circumstances are. We need to figure out what is the best way to move forward. I agree there have been tensions. I am very confident that neither Jamaica nor the US would like to continue in a state of tension. I don’t think that is anything that anybody desires at all.

Mr Aristide is gone and that was of considerable concern to us. We have worked very closely with the Jamaican authorities because of that. We worked very closely with the Jamaican authorities during his presence here.

There still remains the issue of what role Caricom wants to play. The decision has not been made by Caricom as to their recognition of the interim government (in Haiti). We understand that that is something that will be discussed at the July Heads meeting.

I had a communication this morning that reflected a radio interview in Haiti in which the interim (prime minister Gerard Latortue) indicated that he had spoken with Caricom leaders. and very much appreciates Prime Minister Patterson having set the rules in a manner which former President Aristide was not publicly available, and therefore, the concerns that the United States, frankly, had and the interim (prime minister) had about potential disruptions did not occur. So (Prime Minister) Latortue, according to this radio report was expressing his gratitude to the prime minister of Jamaica for the manner in which the Aristide visit was handled.

That still leaves the issue of recognition of the interim government of Haiti. It also leaves what. has left a little bad taste in our mouths – that was the challenges of the integrity over the questions of the assertions that Mr Aristide was kidnapped. That is unresolved.

PD: Whether or not Mr Aristide was physically kidnapped, do you agree with the assertion that what took place in Haiti was essentially a coup d’état?

SC: No. I do not agree with that. I understand the argument. I understand the history leading up to it. I understand that you are not in a position to make a decision because you are forced into certain circumstance, very often because of circumstances (created by) yourself. I do not believe it was a coup d’état.

PD: Do you understand the concerns of small countries such as Jamaica, in this case, and articulated by Mr Patterson?

SC: Yes. I understand. I understand precisely. And I am not so sure that if I were in his position that I wouldn’t be thinking the same thing. But it is a worry that is unfounded.

PD: It is also a perception that the attitude of the US, France, Canada allowed for an assault, ironically, on the multilateral process.

SC: The reason that I don’t think it was a coup. the circumstances did not unfold in one night. This was going for quite some period of time. The fact is that Humpty Dumpty had fallen off the wall quite some time ago. Quite a long time before February 29. It was not going to be… Well, all the king’s horses and all the king’s men were not going to put Humpty Dumpty together again.

PD: So the Caricom initiative was really a non-start from the start?

SC: The Caricom initiative, actually, we thought, was a good plan and we had hopes .

PD: And it was undermined by the United States.?

SC: Undermined? Is that the word you used? That is a word that was used here. I understand that. No. We thought it was a good plan. We were hopeful that it would change the position of those that had been intransigent.

PD: Which is the Haitian opposition?

SC: Yes. It was the Haitian opposition. We couldn’t have forced them to do it. We couldn’t have forced the Haitian opposition to change their position.

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