LAST Saturday, brawta-needy KMTR commuters like myself stood agitated for hours in long lines just to benefit from the double-day top-up offer made by the JUTC. I stood in the sun at the Portmore Mall from 9:00 am. And, hallucinating from my sunstroke, my dazed recollection is that, when I got there I was Caucasian, but by the time I got through, some 4 hours later, I had better resembled the natives.

Incidentally, let me also share with readers that (completely unplanned) I was dressed in my “party colours” on the day. And, as I was nearing the head of the line along came the goodly General Manager Colin Campbell. Not unusually, the processing sped up, but the coincidence of (our) possible nepotism did not escape my attention. Hail Comrade, give thanks!

That bit of idleness aside, let me more seriously preface this article by admitting that, as an Unrepentant Socialist from the 1970s, I naturally emerged with the core

stance for a major public sector role in the economy. But that I later had to concede to the importance of the zero-budgeting or, more precisely, the commercial approach to the management of public sector entities, which Edward Seaga essentially practised in the 1980s. This is a separate matter from his divestment strategy, which I did not endorse.

The relevant issue is that the JUTC needs a smarter set of administrators, rather than just smarter cards, as part of engaging the commercial approach. I am simply amazed at the basic errors related to the operations of this vital entity over the years, which frankly are not all are attributable to the JUTC’s management itself, but more broadly to the portfolio ministry, the Transport Authority, etc.

It is well-accepted that across the globe urban public transportation entities do not generate profits and are largely subsidised. However, it has long been acknowledged that the JUTC needs to develop a provident user-friendly commercially driven fare and commuter model that can increase commuter-use, in order to contain the enormous losses occurring annually on the budget. A critical understanding of how to apply the fundamentals of the “commercial approach” noted above, is what I believe is still lacking in the operations (the saga) of the JUTC.

Indeed, at the time of the significant fare increases in late August, I wrote an article challenging whether JUTC could successfully reverse its fortunes by the substantial increases and literal bullying tactics which preceded those fare hikes.

The basic assessment was that there would be no proportionately impacting revenue intake, as the fare-flexible minibuses and taxis (who nah lef nutten) would invariably further erode the JUTC’s income by pulling away more of the lucrative adult commuter cohort to exacerbate the company’s “loss-income” situation. I now challenge the JUTC to publish its current operating accounts, and for them to be careful how they analyse their income data, to essentially prove my inference wrong.

The aim of this latest (twice held) “double-day” promo must have been two-tiered. Firstly, to spike revenue to offset their continuing cash flow crunch; and secondly to help induce expanded use of the cashless system. Both are justifiable objectives, but I again suggest that a more attractive ongoing commuter model to induce loyal use of the service, provides a far better option.

Such an ongoing commercial model would have prevented the entity losing what I surmise to be roughly two weeks to a month’s worth of income, based upon the observed level of “double-day” purchases made by KMTR commuters on Saturday, which effectively translates to their riding free for whatever the true period.

And please note that, in proposing for the development a proper fare-movement model, it is to be emphasised that there is a key difference between reducing/minimising revenue loss, as against addressing the issue of “loss income”.

Hence, to increase the JUTC’s overall revenue position, there is the astute need to focus not just on increasing fares and protecting revenue, whether through removal of elicit operators, reducing internal misdeeds or containing commuter abuse. The JUTC’s management must look more critically and urgently at ways to contain the phenomenon of “loss income”, simply by commercially attracting greater commuter use of the regular service and inducing compliance with the fares set.

Persons who have had the opportunity to travel within the tri-state area of the US can easily identify such a successful commuter-friendly model. Commuters in New York, etc, are given the option of either a single-ride fare; a discounted multi-route fare for travel in one direction; or a ride-all-day or extended-hours commuter fare.

The JUTC would therefore be better advised to introduce the simple market-driven mechanism of a discounted one-way transfer ticket and a reliable bus schedule, which will similarly induce more KMTR commuters to ride economically and loyally with them.

Coupled with that, the company needs to introduce several pragmatic connecting shuttle-type routes onto which commuters can transfer. These interconnecting shuttle routes should be planned to circumvent the Half-Way-Tree and Downtown hubs, that will allow for more convenient commuter movement across the city and avoid the excessive congestion, as less commuters would then of necessity pass through these hubs.

Then there is the absolute need to introduce an afternoon school-direct bus system to move students from the various schools, using the full JUTC resources. This would be aided by the proposed interconnecting shuttles and reduce the mass congregation of youngsters.

Finally, the Smarter Card system left out the simply smart aspect of providing a far more convenient customer-friendly means of topping-up. I gamble that when the double-day credit runs out, commuters will not again fight to top-up their cards, but basically resort to cash and/or use the alternate means of commute.

The types of measures could thus be used to critically avert “loss income”, or in more positive terms aggregately increase revenue. Not the strategy of chasing the accountability for a lower base of income, through rigid and customer unfriendly fares and rabid revenue inspector scrutiny, who only check empty buses.

The matter really boils down to the proverbial choice between the carrot and the stick.

HWT Transport Centre

Another aspect related to the apparent lack of proper commercial application is, of course, the Half-Way-Tree Transport Centre itself. When this useless edifice (which best only serves as a landmark) was built, it resulted in the JUTC surrendering to its competitors all the fast-lane corridors surrounding the Half-Way-Tree area, as a general transit hub.

Construction of the ill-conceived design, saw the JUTC giving-up the express bus bays north and south of Mandela Park; the Portmore bus bay by York Plaza; and bays along North Odeon Avenue, etc. If the authorities had any awareness of the fast-lane perceptiveness of modern commuters, and moreso the pull of the “drive-driver” attitude of our largely informal populous, this would have alerted them that that blueprint would simply yield the major revenue points.

What the Transport Centre ultimately did was to amalgamate the then several problem areas surrounding Half-Way-Tree into one big problem within this edifice. This now spans from the greater massing of volatile youngsters, duplicating ticketing service (both booth & bus), to the circuitous and congested routing around the Half-Way-Tree area in order to enter/exit the bus park. Plus, the full impact of hazards have not yet been tested upon this non-rainproof structure.

Anyone with knowledge of the major international hubs would realise that, operationally, none of them result in the sort of dangerous mass-clustering that takes place in this poorly conceptualised, designed and expensive to maintain centre. These foreign facilities are spread over a wider, more manageable radius.

And, those who can recall both the buildings and open spaces that existed on this site before the so-called re-development (ie the 3-storey Stanley Motta building, Odeon Cinema, etc.), must — like me — rue the fact that a much simpler and more cost-effective alternative for commuter-transfer and dispatch management within Half-Way-Tree, was not designed using practical covered walk-overs to connect the various sections of terminus.

The savings in concrete and steel from such a simpler system of commuter connection could have gone into the construction of more critically needed vehicular overpasses at the Hope – Constant Spring Road ; Maxfield-Hagley Park and Molynes – Eastwood Park Road intersections.

I think it worthwhile to re-evaluate these issues related to the JUTC’s operations.

docwraythinktankup@gmail.com