When the Jamaican Government decided to convene a Commission of Enquiry (COE) into the circumstances surrounding the death of over 73 civilians in Tivoli Gardens in May 2010, many were concerned about the potential harm the revelations of this enquiry could inflict on the credibility and integrity of our security forces, particularly the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF).

From the outset I have maintained that the Tivoli Enquiry would be one of the better things to happen to the JDF for its future. However, I feel that such a positive outcome depends much on the focus of the enquiry and the JDF’s own attitude to the proceedings. Any attempt at deception or a cover-up could lead to a loss of credibility, a loss of public confidence, and serious doubts about the effectiveness of the JDF from which it would never recover.

Military units all over the world occasionally conduct themselves contrary to training, practice, and doctrine, no matter how well-disciplined and well-trained they are. A common result is that such military units are found guilty of the excessive and unnecessary use of force. From such misgivings, military units can or may survive and remain credible, forgiven by its citizenry only if the misdeeds for which they stand accused are treated with total transparency, and the wrongs are acknowledged and addressed. Attempts at subterfuge, obfuscation, and cover-ups are scorned in democracies such as ours, and when trust is lost it is nigh impossible to be restored.

Admittedly, the manner in which the Tivoli COE is being conducted as a trial of sorts, adversarial in nature, rather than being inquisitorial, has possibly made it difficult for the JDF. It is, after all, a legal contest, the security forces versus the residents of Tivoli Gardens, with the whole truth being the casualty.

Outrageous revelations & recall

The recent revelations presented in evidence before the COE by two JDF soldiers involved in the 2010 operation regarding the alleged killing of civilians by the police, must have well-thinking Jamaicans very concerned, if not outraged. I applaud the courage and loyalty of those soldiers, but must demand answers to some questions. To whom in the JDF did those soldiers report these incidents and when? Was that evidence available from 2010 and was it turned over to the public defender? If the evidence remained at the “soldiers’ level” or their immediate commander, why was that so? I cannot imagine that their evidence was not known right up the chain of command to the chief of defence staff (CDS).

As an aside, where and when did the JDF become aware of the migration status of soldier #2, and isn’t he the same soldier who, the day before he was scheduled to testify before the COE, had an urgent medical appointment and could not attend to give evidence?

Assuming that the former CDS and respective commanders at every level were aware of the evidence of soldiers # 1, 2, and 3, and omitted to include this very significant evidence before the COE, will they be recalled to clear up this omission? And what about the former commissioner of police, Owen Ellington, who certainly gave us the impression that the police did no harm and that he was not aware of excesses or abuse and killings by the police? Will he be recalled? Or would an objection to such a recall be ignored because it is “not in the interests of national security”?

It must be quite clear to the commissioners of the Tivoli COE that they need to do some deep probing into the nature and conduct of this operation. The COE must insist, for instance, that every round discharged by every soldier on this military-driven operation be accounted for. Each soldier who discharged a round must be made to account for the reason and the target(s) fired at. The JDF system makes it very easy to obtain the necessary information to be able to recreate what took place. The commissioners cannot expect lawyers to present them with that information.

Having returned from their break, the commissioners really have to change hats from being judges listening to the case of ‘security forces versus Tivoli residents’, and take out their Sherlock Holmes hats and magnifying glasses and start some inquiring. All we have at present are two diverging accounts: The security forces claim that they used no more force than was reasonably necessary; Tivoli was well fortified with gunmen armed with all manner of weapons. They came under sustained gunfire and eventually secured the area. In the process, they lost one soldier and their vehicles were badly shot up. The JDF admitted it fired up to 37 mortar bombs, not at buildings, but in open spaces to disorient the gunmen and keep Tivoli residents indoors. The people’s story, well…

Dream team vs traumatised

The security forces’ accounts suggest the operation was conducted in a professional manner with great restraint and respect for human life. The witnesses have been very articulate, intelligent, and, with only one exception, appeared to have prepared to the point where they appeared cold and aloof.

The Tivoli residents’ evidence, on the other hand, paint quite a different picture. Their presentations of the killings and allegations of inhumane treatment and damage to the residents’ property have been graphic and emotive. The Tivoli witnesses appeared to find it painful to recount their nightmarish experiences. They were very passionate about their losses, and defiant and dogged when pushed by the deft strategies of the lawyers cross-examining them. Nanny of the Maroons would have been proud of the courage they displayed.

It was strange that in all of this, the security forces fielded only its officers or command element as witnesses, and no one from its rank and file — except for soldier#1 and soldier#3. Weren’t there others on this operation? Would their accounts necessarily support their officers’ evidence.

History making whodunit

After all the evidence presented to date, we still don’t know who killed over 70 Jamaicans in Tivoli in 2010. Were they killed by the JDF or JCF, and why and how were they killed? We still don’t know who damaged the Coronation Market or the Darling Street Police Station, and by what means. We still need to establish the mission of this operation and whether the killing of Mr Keith Clarke at his Kirkland Heights home in May 2010 during the hunt for the former Tivoli Gardens don Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke is indicative of the mindset of the JDF soldiers who took part in the Tivoli operation. An autopsy revealed that Clarke was shot more than 20 times (Jamaica Observer, October 14, 2014). Were there any reported instances of ‘blue-on-blue’ fire and were there any casualties as a result? Are we going to be hearing from the Americans, who, we are told, were a part of this operation or are their activities hidden under the cloak of the “not in the interests of national security” argument?

The killing of over 70 Jamaicans, the largest number of Jamaicans killed in any single security forces operation in independent Jamaica, is not just going to go away. Answers have to be provided without speculation or guesswork. As far as I am aware, there is no statute of limitations to prevent local or international tribunals from hearing evidence if there is general dissatisfaction with the manner or outcome of the proceedings of such a COE.

The JDF still has an opportunity to preserve its reputation as a credible military body, but it is going to take courage and loyalty to Jamaica. The former CDS was courageous enough to admit that he ordered the use of mortars for the 2010 Tivoli operation. Now it is up to the current CDS to display similar courage by disclosing all the information available on the use of that weapons system. Indeed, my final pleas to the current CDS of the JDF is to forget the legal contest and do that which is loyal to Jamaica by handing over every solitary piece of evidence that could assist the Tivoli COE in establishing the whole truth. This will safeguard the credibility of the JDF for all time.

Allan Douglas is a retired colonel of the JDF. Send comments to the Observer or alldouglas@aol.com.