Having spent the last two days reading the Tivoli Commission Report, I am bitterly disappointed that overall responsibility for the excesses committed in May 2010 has not been assigned and the ‘big fish’ have been allowed to go free; that is, Prime Minister Bruce Golding, Chief of Defence Staff Major General Stewart Saunders, and Commissioner of Police Owen Ellington. Minister Dwight Nelson should be included, but it seems, quite inappropriately, that he had very little involvement in the whole operation.

Adverse findings (criticisms) are made mostly of junior staff. No punishment is recommended; just relief of their commands for serving officers “as a protective measure against similar abuses of power in future operations”. This overly soft approach by the commission is made even clearer in the following statement (section 15.20): “Where the accusations of extrajudicial killings on the part of the security forces were found by this commission to be credible, and where persons were identified as being in dereliction of duty or were administratively or operationally incompetent, we recommend that these persons should never again be allowed to lead or otherwise participate in internal security operations.”

For those responsible for extrajudicial killings by the State, either by commission of omission, this is surely no more than a slap on the wrist. It is not enough!

But what of the ‘big fish’? Both Saunders and Ellington come in for strident criticism by the commissioners, Saunders for his authorisation of the completely inappropriate use of mortars, Ellington for his eschewing of responsibility, and both for the poorly planned transition period when accountability was completely blurred. And yet they escape even these soft sanctions because — like some others — “they are no longer serving members of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) and Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF)”.

The case is similarly for Golding, who is roundly condemned for announcing publicly the signing of the extradition order and very effectively commissioning the predictable mayhem that happened thereafter. In his case, the commissioners chose only to conclude with the comment that “in any event, this was a matter of judgement for Mr Golding“.

Chapter 11 of the report deals exclusively with the matter of command responsibility. Criticisms are made, but no effective sanctions are recommended for those at the top. Is this really an appropriate response to an operation (and situation) that, according to both the Public Defender’s Report in 2013, and now the Commission of Enquiry Report 2016, resulted in many, many extrajudicial killings; life-changing injuries; emotional, psychological and property damage?

The report is indeed thorough, and some of its recommendations useful, including a rapid (nine months) compensation exercise, continued investigation of the many ‘probable’ extrajudicial killings, a ‘same person same weapon’ policy, changes to extradition procedures, dismantling inequality and dependency, etc. But the commissioners have largely sidestepped the most important matter of assigning responsibility for the excesses committed. In its own words (section 15.30): “The most significant and worrying feature of our enquiry was the fact that the JCF did not acknowledge responsibility for any civilian deaths whatsoever. The JDF, for its part, gave evidence of only one such death – a sniper on the Blood Bank building. The time has surely come to usher in a radical new culture in the operations of the security forces: a culture that provides for greater transparency and accountability.”

It is truly disappointing that no sanctions were recommended for those with overall responsibility for the excesses committed in Tivoli in 2010.

Paul Ward represents the Campaign for Social & Economic Justice. Send comments to the Observer or pgward72@gmail.com.

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