There was strong opposition from some quarters to the idea of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) even before it was established in 2008 and although it was a manifesto commitment on which the Government was elected in 2007. It was argued that members of parliament should not be involved in determining any of the projects in their constituencies on which Government funds are to be spent. That authority, they insist, belongs to the government bureaucrats who have the technical competence to determine priorities.

The functioning of Government, it is contended, should be clearly defined and separated. The Cabinet must set policy and oversee their execution. The bureaucrats should implement those policies and the projects that flow from them. Members of parliament should authorise the appropriate expenditure, approve legislation and hold the other two functionaries to account. Their role in addressing the needs of their constituencies is to make representations, presumably, to the bureaucrats.

There was even some unease at the political leadership level that the CDF would give members of parliament too much independence and make it more difficult to keep them in line.

The politician’s dilemma

In seeking to become a member of parliament, a candidate must persuade the voters that he or she is the most capable and sincerely committed person to ensure that, as far as possible, their needs are met and the quality of their lives is improved. These cover a wide spectrum that includes better education and health services, job creation, security, administration of justice, increased opportunities for economic and social advancement, efficient public transportation, social welfare, etc.

In practical terms, members of parliament are only tangentially engaged in these areas that are essentially the domain of Cabinet ministers and Government bureaucrats. They may seek to exert influence in these areas by making proposals and representations or, at the extreme, withholding approval for expenditure or legislation as a quid pro quo.

However, the mandate of members of parliament and the expectations of their constituents do not end there. In fact, they are held accountable far more for the extent to which they are able to address the parochial needs of their constituents — roads, water supply, electricity, solid waste management, community facilities, etc.

Effective representation in the eyes of the voter

A half mile of paved road, water pipes or electric lines may make a world of difference to the quality of life in a remote rural district but may command little priority in the mind of the bureaucrat to whom, we are told, that decision should be left. He or she is likely to conclude that the economic rate of return does not justify the expenditure. A homework facility in a depressed and, perhaps, volatile inner-city community to provide a conducive environment for students to learn or the provision of a few computers to a struggling school may escape the attention of a bureaucrat who is focusing on the “big picture”.

Those bureaucrats are not accountable to the voters. They have never interacted with them, are not the persons they elected and those voters have no means of holding them to account. Neither do their members of parliament since the appointment, sanctioning or removal of those bureaucrats is not in their hands.

Members of parliament are often ridiculed for coming with their two long, empty hands and so-so mouth. They are likely to be chased out of town if the explanation they offer is that they have no control over the identification of projects and their representations have fallen on deaf ears. It is hard on Opposition members of parliament who have little, if any, influence over ministers and bureaucrats. They try to escape the wrath of their constituents by claiming political victimisation which may be real or contrived. It is even harder on government backbenchers who may not be able to exert any influence either and can plead no such excuse.

Falling through

One of the reasons for urban sprawl and decay and the social problems they create is the systemic neglect of deep rural communities and the resulting migration to towns and cities where life may be a little less unbearable as well as of depressed inner-city communities that have far outgrown the curtain behind which they could be concealed.

The CDF was designed to alleviate — although to only a limited extent — this imbalance in the allocation of Government resources as well as the dilemma members of parliament face in providing effective representation. The concept, as laid out when it was established in 2008, sought to achieve this objective while, importantly, instituting measures to ensure that it wasn’t used as a pork barrel or slush fund.

Budgetary commitment

At the outset the allocation through the CDF was $40 million for each constituency, which amounted to a half of one per cent of the total Government budget. However, by the following year, as the fiscal situation worsened, the allocation was reduced to $20 million and further reduced to $15 million in 2010. It remained at that level until 2016 when it was restored to $20 million. That figure would need to be increased to $55 million today to get back to the half of one per cent of total expenditure at which the programme was introduced.

Members of the US Congress have long devised their own way of securing the interests of their constituents and delivering on their representation. They do so by the use of “earmarks”, which are specific expenditure line items for projects in their districts that they insist must be inserted in the annual budget as a condition of their approval. Members from opposing sides sometimes collaborate with each other in securing these earmarks and the US Administration is often obliged to accommodate them in order to secure budget approval. The value of these earmarks fluctuates between one and two per cent of annual budget expenditure.

Those who bash the CDF would find it difficult (even though they would still try) to criticise the members of our Parliament if they adopted such an approach. It would be perfectly within their right to do so since the Constitution vests in them the authority to approve budgetary expenditure. Yet it is hardly an appropriate alternative to the CDF since it leads to uncertainty and even chaos in the budget process. What would a Government do if members of parliament from both sides ganged up to demand budgetary allocations for their constituencies that would throw the entire budget into disarray?

Transparency and accountability

There were several stipulations that were laid out in 2008 for the operation of the programme. Each member of parliament was to have been required to submit to Parliament, within six months of being elected, a five-year Constituency Development Plan identifying the projects on which the allocations would be spent. The relevant Government agencies would provide technical support for the preparation of the plan. Guidelines were to be established regarding the type of projects that could be included and their sustainability as well as their economic and social impact. The plan would be subject to approval and oversight by a special committee of Parliament with sufficient flexibility to allow for changes as circumstances may require.

Consultation and participation at the local level were to be important requirements. Prior to submission to Parliament, the plan and any significant changes made subsequently thereto would have to be endorsed by a Constituency Consultative Committee that would include community leaders and representatives of both major political parties. This committee would be required to monitor the implementation of projects and submit an annual report to Parliament.

Projects were to be managed by the appropriate Government agencies including certification and disbursements and were to be subject to the rules that apply to the award of Government contracts.

A special unit was to be established and funded in the Auditor General’s Department to carry out detailed — not merely random — audits of the projects in each constituency and submit special reports to Parliament.

Enhancing the CDF

The CDF is not unique to Jamaica. Similar programmes exist in several other countries in Africa as well as India, Pakistan, Malaysia and The Philippines. The concept has attracted international attention with studies having been carried out by the World Bank, the Center for International Development at State University of New York and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association which has published a handbook of best practices to guide the operation of such programmes.

Members of Parliament, themselves, and successive governments must accept the blame for the failure to fully roll out the framework that was outlined at the inception of the programme. This would have enabled the CDF to be developed and promoted in a way that commands the public confidence and support required to counter the attacks from those who describe it as a pork barrel that should be scrapped yet do not hesitate to castigate members of parliament for “non-performance”. It is not too late for this to be done and that should be a pre-condition for raising the allocation to what it ought to be which, on a phased basis, should be at least one per cent of total expenditure.

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