Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley, National Heroes of Jamaica, were cousins who steered Jamaica in the tumultuous years from 1938 through to Independence in 1962 (and beyond).

They were the first leaders of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP). We revere, or at least acknowledge, their stewardship, commitment, and sacrifice. But the cousins were also rivals who shaped, or helped to shape, the fortunes of Jamaica’s dominant political parties and trade unions throughout the period of constitutional decolonisation.

As rivals, they adopted divergent approaches, strategies, and tactics. What were some of these points of divergence, and what were some of the important issues that separated these two leaders, as reflected in their own views and in the eyes of some scholars and contemporaries?

 ‘A certain wildness’

Bustamante and Manley shared the same maternal grandmother, Elsie (nee Hunter). In his fragment of an autobiography, reproduced in Manley & the New Jamaica (edited by Rex Nettleford), Norman Manley recalled that his elder cousin, at age 21 or 22, had a “zest for life”, “a certain wildness”, and “indifference for what others thought”, but suggested that nothing else pointed to “the person he would become when he was 50-odd years old” (1971, p xcvii).

The Bustamante-Manley relationship first assumed public prominence when the latter was called upon to put his superlative legal skills, honed at Jesus College, Oxford, in seeking the release of Bustamante from detention. Although Bustamante was twice detained by the British for political activities and for exercising basic civil liberties, neither he nor Manley seemed to harbour long-term bitterness towards the British.

 Colonialism

In an essay entitled ‘The Revolt Against Colonialism’, the British historian Richard Pares – not known for his radicalism – commented that hostility towards British colonialism was not always proportionate to the mother country’s deserts. Noting that British authorities “appear to be more popular among the West Indians…than among the East Indians”, Pares suggested that it could have been otherwise, given, among other things, the West Indian experience of slavery ( The Historian’s Business (1961), p 77). Manley and Bustamante shared suspicions about aspects of British rule, but even in the midst of the 1938 labour disputes neither could have been described as fierce in their challenge to British authority.

Shearer’s Viewpoint

Arising from the political cauldron of 1938, Bustamante emerged as Jamaica’s leading trade unionist and a populist leader of the first order. In the book, Presidents, Prime Ministers and Governors of the English-Speaking Caribbean and Puerto Rico: Conversations and Correspondence (edited by Robert Alexander, 1997), Hugh Shearer offered views – in June 1948 – on Bustamante’s relationship with his supporters. He indicated that: “The appeal of the Bustamante people has been principally to the lower classes, rather than to the middle classes…only demagoguery and an appeal of personality would win them to the movement.” (p 17)

Shearer also acknowledged that the personality-driven approach had its dangers and was “not too democratic”, but added that efforts were being made to change things, so that party and union loyalty would become affixed to “the organisation and its ideas”, rather than “just loyalty to Bustamante”.

President for life

The nomenclature assigned to the union, the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU), the fact that Bustamante was made its president for life, and the powers of appointment given to the president all underlined the paramountcy of the leader, although in some instances, aspects of this approach prompted resistance. George Eaton, in Alexander Bustamante and Modern Jamaica reported, for instance, that in the early days the president of the Chauffeurs Union resisted membership in the BITU arguing as follows: “When you name a union after any one man, it is a sure sign that somebody is going to be a dictator.” (pp 62-63)

 Middle class politics

The working class foundation of the JLP and BITU is contrasted in some of the literature of political science with the middle class orientation of the PNP. The PNP, under Manley’s leadership, may have used this in political discourse, but have exposed themselves to criticism on this score. According to Louis Lindsay in his path-breaking work on The Myth of Independence: Middle Class Politics and Non-mobilisation in Jamaica (1975), early PNP leaders may have spent inordinate time seeking to “belittle and humiliate” Bustamante.

They tended, Lindsay argued, to project an image of Bustamante as “illiterate and semi-idiotic” as a means of shoring up the PNP’s own, insecure, middle class support base. And for Lindsay, this PNP strategy may have undermined the party’s projection of its “plans, policies, and ambitions”. (p 24)

Personality politics

But while there is force in Lindsay’s contentions, the point should not be overstated. The early PNP could arguably have countered Lindsay’s strictures in at least three ways. First, Bustamante, by his style and methods, had brought personality politics to the fore of national discourse. In response, Norman Manley and his colleagues were entitled to challenge Bustamante’s embellishments. In this regard, Bustamante’s assertions about his adoption by a Spanish general and his membership in a Spanish radical army were probably easy targets for the PNP: “This is all false,” held Manley. (Robert Alexander, p 18)

Secondly, the PNP could have argued that its personality-driven approach to Bustamante was part of the rough and tumble of politics. True, it was not becoming of a political party which promoted its intellectual foundation as an asset; but, the PNP may have taken the view that if Bustamante’s tales were tall, political acumen required them to challenge these stories.

Glasspole on policy

Thirdly, it was plausible for the PNP to challenge Bustamante the person, and simultaneously, present plans, policies, and ambitions for Jamaica. In fact, bearing in mind the PNP’s projection of Manley as the “Man with the Plan” (1957), and the flow of argumentation in Jamaican politics, the PNP could maintain that Lindsay was being a touch harsh.

In a 1949 interview, Florizel Glasspole recounted some of the core PNP policies, these included: sugar cooperatives; some degree of industrialisation; a policy of economic “nationalism” (control of tariff and monetary policies); nationalisation of the electricity, transportation, telephone services, and “any industry that is basic to the economy of the nation”; and enhancing the standard of living of the poor. (Robert Alexander (ed), p 48)

Communism?

But if Manley had the edge on Bustamante in the propaganda battle of personalities, the tables seem to have been turned – as a matter of politicking – on the question of communism. In one form or another, the story is well-known. The PNP, on the model of the British Labour Party, declared itself to be democratic socialist at an early stage. The essential feature of this model was that the State would control the commanding heights of the economy and play an active role in directing the affairs of the country’s mixed economy.

With the benefit of hindsight, however, the socialist label, even when adorned with the democratic qualification, appears to have placed (Father) Manley on the defensive. On June 20, 1948, in conversation with Robert Alexander (p 17), Manley emphasised that the PNP was a “moderate socialist party” and noted that at the time of its establishment in 1938, it was “merely a reform party”. He added that it was “not until” 1940 that the party proclaimed itself a socialist party: this is not socialist commitment on full throttle.

The reasons for Manley’s defensive posture are not difficult to discern. For a start, the JLP was keen to characterise PNP socialism as communism in disguise. Speaking to Robert Alexander in 1948, for instance, Hugh Shearer recalled that when Bustamante was in detention (up to 1942), the PNP “tried to bore from him within his unions”. In Shearer’s view, the PNP ordered “its people” to work to take over the Bustamante unions: “(T)hese are communist tactics,” he declared. (p 27)

The 4Hs

Within the PNP itself, there was also the perception among some members that caution should be exercised in drawing the line between democratic socialism and communism in the party’s praxis. On this point, Florizel Glasspole’s comments on the famous episode concerning the expulsion of the “4Hs” – Ken Hill, Frank Hill, Richard Hart, and Arthur Henry – are instructive.

In a conversation with Robert Alexander on July 17, 1952, Glasspole pointed out that when various PNP unions amalgamated to form the Trades Union Congress in 1948, matters proceeded satisfactorily in the initial stages. Then, in about 1950, he, Glasspole, “began to get the feeling that he was being systematically undermined by the Hill people, in real communist fashion”. (Alexander, p 50)

Political junkheap

Glasspole went on to summarise some of the evidence brought against the 4Hs in their case before the PNP’s investigation commission, chaired by Norman Manley. In his view, the evidence indicated that “the Hill group intended to destroy Glasspole completely as the chief anticommunist trade union leader, and to use Manley as long as he would serve them, after which he would be put on the junkheap”. (ibid, p 51) The 4Hs were expelled.

Manley, himself, was mindful of the risk of being placed on the junkheap. In a March 16, 1954 conversation with Robert Alexander, he noted that “the communists, when they come to power, will eliminate those they disagree with”. He added that he had decided “long ago” that he would not allow himself “to be thus eliminated”. (ibid, p 25)

The fact that the debate on the relationship between socialism and communism assumed vigorous, if not ferocious, proportions in the 1980 General Election in Jamaica provides a measure of the resilience of this issue in the country’s politics.

Federation

Another important political issue considered by Manley and Bustamante concerned the question of Caribbean federation, and the related matter of the timing of Independence. In brief, Manley was consistently supportive of the West Indian Federation, regarded the federation as an avenue to Independence, and provided leadership in the structuring of both federal arrangements and the arrangements for Independence when Jamaica withdrew from the federation.

Manley’s decisions to call the referendum on federation and to opt out of becoming a leader in the Federal Government remain items of political disagreement to this day. Similarly, his decision to call early elections in Jamaica in the run-up to Independence was controversial at the time, and worked to the detriment of the PNP at the polls.

‘Paupers’

Bustamante adopted a more ambivalent posture on federation, but was supportive up to a point. As George Eaton reported, at the 1947 Montego Bay Conference on the subject, Bustamante had initially opposed “a federation of paupers, foisted by Britain to escape her ancient responsibilities”. (Eaton, p 173) By the end of this conference, however, Bustamante offered support, noting that efforts should be made to “blast away the obstacles” to federation.

Interestingly, Eaton also suggested that Bustamante may not have been enamoured with the process of political campaigning in Barbados and Trinidad. These venues, he argued, tended to carry more sophisticated, issues-based audiences, given to heckling speakers. Bustamante could not “mesmerise” his Eastern Caribbean audiences “by substituting antics or clowning for serious discourse”. (p 172) More generally, it may be fair to argue that as soon as it emerged that Jamaica could obtain Independence as a single state outside the federation, the pragmatic Bustamante was fully prepared to proceed without others.

Politician and intellectual

Finally, to return to the question of personality, one may think that Norman Manley, Eric Williams, and Grantley Adams, as Oxford-trained scholars who had ventured into politics, would have formed special bonds within the federation, possibly to the exclusion of Bustamante. Indeed, Eaton makes this point, indicating that the Oxonians would find it easier to develop closer ties with each other than with the “conservative and egocentric Bustamante”. (p 173)

But this was not necessarily true. Here is how Robert Alexander paraphrased comments on the matter by Grantley Adams, made on June 20, 1969: “In a way, Adams admired Bustamante. [Bustamante] was a convinced conservative on many issues, and boasted that his income was richer than that of Jamaica. But he was always on the side of the poor in any specific issue. He was a much better politician than Norman Manley, although Manley was many times his superior from an intellectual point of view.” (Alexander, p 152)

The politician and the intellectual – the cousins – have left their indelible marks on Jamaican history.

Ambassador Stephen Vasciannie is Professor of International Law at the University of the West Indies, Mona.