Reparation for enslavement
On reparation, the main question for me is whether the British State should be required to compensate the people of the Caribbean for the wrongs associated with chattel slavery.
On moral grounds, this is an easy case to make. We were oppressed for almost 300 years in a vile system of abuse which relied on brute force and psychological deceit to hold down Africans and persons of African descent. For this, the British are morally responsible.
Humanity’s Inhumanity
That moral responsibility is heightened by the realities of the Caribbean today. Extreme poverty, income maldistribution, limited access to good education and health care, land hunger, unnecessarily high levels of malnutrition, the embarrassing popularity of skin bleaching, the high crime rate, alienation and disrespect for the rule of law, are all symptoms of underlying social and economic malaise that may be traced back convincingly to the transatlantic system of enslavement.
We could say, humanity’s inhumanity, stretching back into slavery, makes countless thousands suffer even today.
So, I support the notion that the British should enhance their efforts to assist the Caribbean to lift itself towards self-sustaining development. Britain cannot stand on the side lines today, for that country, through its empire, was firmly implicated in the creation and maintenance of the moral wrong of slavery. This, I am sure, is a part of the Caricom Plan that seeks reparation. It derives force from efforts by, among others, Judge Robinson, former Prime Minister Patterson, the late Dudley Thompson, Mike Henry, Lord Gifford, Vice Chancellor Beckles, professors Verene Shepherd and Rupert Lewis, Frank Phipps, Bert Samuels, and Barbara Blake Hannah.
Challenges?
Some challenges to reparation have emerged. It is said, for example, that Africans too were involved in the slave trade. This, for me, does not undermine the fact that Britain was a central organiser of the system and was instrumental in its application. African participation does not displace primary British responsibility. “Primary” does not mean “exclusive”, as the International Court of Justice had occasion to emphasise in the Expenses Case in 1962.
As a point against reparation, it is also said that reparation could lead to a situation in which “I-owe-me” (as Dwight Whylie once noted in the Observer). Here, the argument is that there has been some degree of inter-racial sexual mixing in the Caribbean (not always consensual), and this has meant that some Caribbean nationals today owe their heritage to Africa, Britain and other places. Should the British part of one’s heritage generate moral responsibility for the African part? Perhaps this should not detain us for too long. In the general circumstances, we can identify “the British heirs and successors” for the purposes of responsibility.
Passage of Time
A more difficult moral problem concerns the impact of the passage of time. The British slave system ended fully in 1838, nearly 184 years ago. All the victims and all the perpetrators of the system have passed away, and so too have their descendants on either side. Clearly, then, we are not dealing with issues of personal responsibility. Rather, we are saying that the responsibility of the British nation for slavery has endured for 184 years, and that Caribbean suffering related to enslavement has been of similar durability.
Because the impact of slavery persists in the Caribbean, I believe reparations are morally justifiable even after 184 years. Many of our problems are fruit of the long-lasting poisonous tree. Some British descendants may suggest, however, that they too have been victims of aspects of formal British policy in the past. Why, they may ask, should they bear any of the burden for the rectification of British wrongs vis-a-vis victims in a system from which they derived no benefit?
The answer to this is twofold. First, even some of the historically oppressed in Britain today may have benefitted indirectly from the slave system, and thus should bear, once again indirectly, the burdens implicit in social responsibility. Second, the reparation assertions cannot be deflected merely by showing that benefits of slavery have been disparately shared in Britain. The point is that Britain, as a society, exploited African enslaved persons and benefitted economically from this approach for many years. This justifies some form of reparatory action.
Onus of Independence
Another possible argument against reparation is that Caribbean countries — as independent States — have failed to provide us with the stewardship that would have removed the ill-effects of historical enslavement. The fault then is said to rest with modern leadership: we should stop living in the past and follow, instead, the example of countries such as Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore, that have broken the poverty cycle through carefully crafted, forward-looking, development strategies. Modern leaders, it is suggested, should break the chain of causation between slavery and current Caribbean problems.
Yes, Caribbean people have a duty to work towards development; but, in my view, this does not erase the fact that enslavement has been a major contributory factor in our persistent poverty (as the distinguished Professor George Beckford reminded us).
Legal Case
Now, although I believe the moral case for reparations is unassailable, the legal arguments may be less straightforward. The legal position should be built on general principles of international law — and will need to be constructed with precision.
International law proceeds on the basis that a breach of the law gives rise to a duty to pay compensation. This starting point was advanced, most notably, by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory Case (Germany v Poland) in 1928.
More recently, this approach was affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the case of The Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda in February 2022. In the latter case, the court found that Uganda must pay the Democratic of the Congo US$325 million in reparation for damages arising from Ugandan legal wrongs in the Congo.
The argument for reparatory justice in law should therefore be that slavery was contrary to international law at the time it was in place in the Caribbean, and that reparations should be paid to address this illegality.
Ambassador Stephen Vasciannie is Professor of International Law at the University of the West Indies.