The first day on which the local racing product was delivered in the United States’ 1930 claiming system model was January 17, 1993. Tomorrow marks the 33rd anniversary and the commencement of the 34th year of the misguided and uninformed decision to abandon the delivery of the racing product in a proven, viable handicap system.

This was the worst business decision in the history of any local commercial activity, for which the architects must be blamed individually and collectively for their misunderstanding of what is required for the viable promotion of horse racing. The fact of the matter is that for 33 years, horse racing has not had the benefit of the requisite management for development and under the claiming system, the racing product became immune to profitability!

With this anniversary, it is appropriate to present acritical and data-based analysis of the performance of the claiming system racing product. One hopes that this assessment rises to the level of a document encapsulating the 33 years. This exercise is another attempt to assist in the acknowledgement of the irrefutable facts, but the surviving architects are unlikely to respond.

The opening of the Caymanas race track in August 1959 catapulted horse racing into the then-modern era of parimutuel wagering, with the electromechanical totalisator offering single bets to win, place, double events, and quinelas. There were 29 race meetings in 1960, which was the first full year of operations. By 1992, the calendar had grown to 84 race days, peaking at an average of 115 runners on each programme and between 11 and 12 races each day. Ironically, the 34th year of claiming will commence with a programme of eight races with 86 declarations.

Based on two false premises, a group of conspiracists convinced themselves that this racing product, growing spectacularly at an annual average of 10% under the handicap system, lacked integrity. Additionally, and consequentially, they thought that introducing a US claiming system model, the trading of racehorses, could become an economically viable activity. This was, and remains, impossible!

Furthermore, these conspiracy theorists believed that a tote monopoly was preferable to a bookmaking industry, which was the foundation of the industry everywhere else in the world. This, except in the United States, where, similar to the 2019 Volstead or National Prohibition Act, which banned the sale of alcohol, bookmaking was also misguidedly outlawed in the United States.

This decision, predictably, is still undermining US industry growth96 years later. However, effective October 24, 2025 the US Jockey Club has applied a rating system which classifies the horse population for handicapping purposes. Incidentally, a few years after Arima Race Club, the promoters in Trinidad & Tobago, adopted the claiming system in the early 2000s, race meetings plummeted from 44 annually to 12 by 2020.

Here are three more of the reasons why the claiming system has failed:

(1) The horse population was divided into 25 categories, in a system of inaccurate classification, rendering each race day with fewer declarations.This artificial classification ensured that in over 80 per cent of races, inferior horses conceded weight to superior ones, leading to a huge number of odds-on favourites discouraging betting.

This, along with an average of 20 per cent less in field sizes, has led to a corresponding 20 per cent in sales for the equivalent of a $100-billion underperformance of the product’s revenue over the 33 years of claiming.

(2) In contrast to the handicap system with seven classes based on ability, a claiming system model is complicated and not easily understood by the average person. In fact, provably,many of the operatives of the stakeholdershave never developed a full understanding of the claiming system’s inherent flaws.

(3) Under the handicap system, up until 1992, wagering on horse racing had mass appeal, even including women, driving growth, but since then, under a claiming system,its statusis best summed up as underperforming, although in a captured niche market space.

Fatally, the change to a claiming system changed the profile of owning racehorses from a sport/hobby to a business opportunity, which is inherently unviable. The owning of racehorses is therefore reserved for people with the wherewithal to indulge in this sporting activity. What is most important is the economic viability of the promoting company, which the stakeholders have yet to understand. Next, I will present the irrefutable statistics to highlight the financial malaise.