Is Jamaica’s invisible economy carrying the country?
There is an economy Jamaicans interact with every day yet rarely see reflected in official discussions. It pays rent when formal wages fall short. It absorbs shocks when jobs disappear. It feeds households during crises. And for a large share of the population, it is the only economy that reliably works.
This is Jamaica’s informal economy, and by most credible estimates, it is far larger and more important than we are comfortable admitting. Economists define the informal economy as economic activity that is legal in nature but not fully regulated, registered, or taxed. In Jamaica, this includes street vending, small-scale farming, domestic work, cash-based services, informal transport, freelancing, and countless micro-enterprises that operate below the threshold of formality.
Globally, the International Labour Organization estimates that about 60 per cent of the world’s workforce is informal. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the figure is lower but still substantial, often ranging between 40 and 55 per cent, depending on the country and methodology used.
For Jamaica, multiple regional studies and development bank estimates place informal employment at between 40 and 50 per cent of the labour force when full and partial informality are combined. That means nearly half of working Jamaicans earn some or all of their income outside the formal system.
This is not a fringe phenomenon; it is structural. The contribution of this activity to national output is harder to measure, precisely because it is informal. However, economists typically estimate that informal production in small developing economies accounts for 20 to 40 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). Even at the lower end of that range, this represents hundreds of billions of Jamaican dollars in economic activity each year. Yet this economy exists largely without policy recognition.
Why does this matter? The informal economy is not merely a tax issue; it is functioning as Jamaica’s de facto welfare and insurance system.
Consider employment volatility. Jamaica’s economy is highly exposed to external shocks. Tourism, remittances, and global commodity prices all fluctuate beyond local control. When downturns occur, formal employment contracts quickly; informal work adjusts faster; people take on multiple small income streams; households diversify survival strategies; and consumption falls less sharply than formal indicators suggest.
This pattern has been observed repeatedly. During economic slowdowns, official employment figures worsen, but total household survival does not collapse. Informality absorbs the blow.
Remittances reinforce this system. Jamaica consistently ranks among the top countries globally in remittance inflows relative to GDP, often exceeding 20 per cent of GDP in recent years. These flows support consumption, stabilise foreign exchange, and act as private social protection for hundreds of thousands of households.
Together, informal work and remittances form a parallel safety net, operating quietly when formal systems are thin. From a purely economic standpoint, this has benefits. It reduces extreme deprivation, smooths income volatility, and increases resilience. But it also creates serious long-term costs.
Productivity is the first casualty. Informal firms tend to remain small by design. Growth attracts visibility. Visibility attracts regulation. Regulation brings costs many cannot absorb. As a result, businesses limit scale, avoid formal credit, and underinvest in technology and skills. Output per worker remains low, even when effort is high.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has shown that economies with large informal sectors experience significantly lower productivity growth than peers with higher formalisation. This is not because people are less capable, but because incentives are misaligned.
Public revenue is the second casualty. When large shares of economic activity fall outside taxation, the burden concentrates on a smaller formal base. This raises compliance pressure, encourages avoidance, and limits the State’s capacity to deliver services. The result is a vicious cycle. Weak services discourage formality, and informality weakens services further.
But the most damaging effect is less visible. Informality reshapes how people relate to the State. When survival depends on operating around institutions rather than through them, trust erodes. Rules are viewed as obstacles, not protections. Compliance becomes strategic, not civic. This undermines legitimacy in ways that cannot be fixed through enforcement alone.
Importantly, most informal workers are not rejecting the State, they are responding to a mismatch between system design and lived reality. Formality in Jamaica often requires stable income, extensive documentation, time-consuming processes, and upfront costs. Informality offers speed, flexibility, and autonomy. Until formality competes on these dimensions, policy appeals will fail.
International evidence is clear on this point. Countries that successfully reduce informality do not rely primarily on crackdowns. They simplify registration, lower compliance costs, provide real benefits for participation, and enforce rules consistently rather than episodically.
Formality becomes attractive when it offers protection, not just obligation. This is where Jamaica’s policy conversation needs to evolve. The informal economy is not evidence of lawlessness. It is evidence of adaptation. It reveals what people need: predictability, dignity, flexibility, and security. Ignoring this reality leads to policies that punish symptoms rather than address causes.
The question is not whether Jamaica should formalise more of its economy. It is whether Jamaica is willing to redesign formality so that people choose it voluntarily. Until that happens, the invisible economy will continue doing the heavy lifting, quietly supporting households, stabilising consumption, and filling gaps the formal system has not yet closed.
And until it is properly understood, Jamaica will continue underestimating both its resilience and its risk.
Janiel McEwan is an economic consultant. Send comments to the Jamaica Observer or janielmcewan17@gmail.com.
Janiel McEwan