In terms of impact, there are three documents that are the most important in the history of the local racing industry. Namely, the 1975 Jamaica Racing Commission (JRC) Act, the 2011 Rudolph Muir Task Force Report commissioned by the then Finance Minister Audley Shaw, and the 2016 Divestment Agreement, of which the first two will be dealt with in today’s article.

The JRC’s remit was to supplant the private Jockey Club and regulate all aspects of the industry. By 1977, a comprehensive volume of Racing Rules established the parameters governing the structure and functions of the regulatory body. This, as it relates to the issuance of licences to trainers, jockeys, and grooms, as well as permits to owners and support of the breeding industry.

The appointment of its own authorised personnel as Operation Stewards, a panel of handicappers to approve the annual racing calendar, and also to maintain a system of classification of the horse population to drive competitive betting in all races. Further, to constitute a First Instance Tribunal panel to adjudicate on corrupt practices, and importantly, a veterinary and a statistics department.

Now on to the task force. The late Rudolph Muir, a former deputy governor of the Bank Of Jamaica, and chair of the JRC & Betting Gaming & Lotteries Commission, undertook the responsibility of overseeing the remit, to quote, “develop policy framework and modus operandi for the divestment of Caymanas Track Limited(CTL), having regard to industry policy for the development of racetracks in Jamaica and all other pertinent factors”.

Muir’s detailed report was presented to the minister on December 21, 2011, and makes interesting reading material. It examined the “previous attempts at privatization of Caymanas Park and lessons learnt therefrom”. The task force also spent a lot of time listening to the pros and cons of establishing a new track.

To this day, I cannot believe that there are so many stakeholders who do not, and maybe never will, understand that with around 285 of the 365 days each year there is no horse racing at Caymanas, it is, therefore, not a professional essential service but effectively a semi-professional organisation, at best, in sustaining a pastime.

Ownership of a racehorse is not a business asset, it is no more than an expensive pet to keep and care for. The returns rarely exceed the financial outlay. Horseracing is a sport, but it needs a viable promoting company to exist, and owners of horses must facilitate this necessity for their own enjoyment. However, there is a delusional expectation that a profit could or should accrue from the ownership of thoroughbreds, informed by a mindset that this is an investment.

In compiling this comprehensive and exhaustive document, the task force heard submissions from representatives of the bidders for divestment, the Breeders Association, Trainers Association, Jockeys Guild, Grooms Association, as well as the bookmakers. However, demonstrated in these presentations was a serious knowledge deficit of what was required for the successful promotion of horse racing. No one in any of these cohorts questioned the viability of the racing product delivered in the hopelessly flawed claiming system model.

Be reminded that claiming was established in Jamaica on the false premises that, under a handicap system, with an average growth rate of 10 per cent annually, the racing product lacked integrity, and that the trading of racehorses could be a viable economic activity. Both of these premises were provably unlikely to drive growth in the gaming market. Despite the data-based analysis made available to the stakeholders, promoters, and regulators by this writer, their resistance persisted, with the subsequent and now almost disastrous consequences.

Note that the CTL Financial Statement of 2012 confirmed losses accumulated to $149 million, and in 2013, it was $98 million. By 2014, delayed payment of purses was a feature of CTL’s precarious balancing act of cash flow. Hence, a financial broker was engaged to provide cash advances of purposes to the owners at undisclosed rates of interest, which was in the best interest of the management of restive stakeholder bodies.

In terms of the deliverables by Supreme Ventures Limited, operationalised by its subsidiary Supreme Ventures Racing & Entertainment Limited (SVREL), the 2016 Divestment Agreement for the modernisation of the Caymanas racing plant and the revitalisation and development of the industry, a month away from the ninth anniversary of the start-up, has not been achieved.

Truth be told, with SVREL forced by the stakeholders to work with the declining claiming system product, development is more than a long way off. In my next article I will analyse the specifics of what the Divestment Agreement demands and why it has not been achievable a decade later.