TODAY’S continuation of the Klansman gang trial is expected to settle keenly contested issues surrounding ballistics evidence. It was one of the points over which the defence and prosecution vigorously sparred, once again, during the last session on Tuesday.

It is now up to Supreme Court Judge Justice Dale Palmer to rule on whether the court will accept an application by the Crown — in the ongoing trial of 25 suspected members of the alleged Tesha Miller faction of the gang — to have 10 ballistics certificates relating to gun crimes supposedly carried out by the accused, “tendered and admitted into evidence”.

At the start of the trial on Wednesday February 4, the prosecution had made the application regarding notices served by it on the defence pursuant to section 46 (a) of the Firearms Act of 1967 relating to incidents to which the ballistics certificates are linked. At that time oral objections were raised by the defence and a written objection later filed by Attorney John Clarke who represents alleged gang leader Tesha Miller.

On Tuesday an acting deputy director of public prosecutions, who has been leading the evidence in a renewed application, indicated that the notices were prepared, filed and signed on January 27, 2026 and disclosed on the defence the same day. This was three clear days before the trial commenced as required under Section 46 (a) of the Firearms Act 1967, which was still in force at that time.

“I take note and so submit that having regard to the provisions of section 46 (a), once it is that the Crown complies with the time requirements from that section, in the language of the statute, the documents which are attached to the notice shall be tendered and admitted into evidence. I don’t wish to try or even attempt to lecture in respect to that particular term… Suffice it to say that it is trite that the term “shall”, has been judiciarily accepted to mean “mandatory”. In this case, having complied with the preconditions and the time requirements, we are submitting that the documents ought to be tendered and admitted into evidence,” the senior prosecutor argued.

In referencing two written objections filed by Clarke, the senior prosecutor pointed out that the first, titled Notice of Objection, is dated 5th February 2026 but was filed on the 10th day of February 2026. This was approximately six days after the commencement of the trial, and approximately 10 days-plus after the documents were served on the defence.

“The notices, certainly the first one — because the second titled notice of objection [is] ‘to any and all notices to come issued by the Crown’ – I simply submit that I don’t believe that is a notice known to the law and it’s not one which is proper in any event. One can’t object to what is not even placed before the Court,” the senior prosecutor contended.

Speaking further on the notice which was filed on behalf of defendants Tesha Miller, Jermaine Hall, Sharn Gilzene, Conroy Cadogan and Kemar Miller, the prosecutor was even more forceful, arguing, “In respect to that notice it is certainly out of time and ought not to prevent Your Lordship from allowing the documents to be tendered and admitted into evidence.”

However in her submissions, defence attorney Denise Hinson said the notices were improperly served.

“The notices were served under Section 46 of the Old Firearms Act. Some of the reports were prepared subsequent to the repealing of that Act, the men were charged subsequent to the repealing of that Act, the men are being prosecuted under the Criminal Justice (Suppression of Criminal Organizations) Act. It is our submission that the notices were improperly given under the Old Firearms Act which has been repealed and so the three clear days requirement under that Act do not apply. That is the thrust of our submission,” Hinson argued.

The prosecutor however was at pains to point out that the new legislation — The Firearms (Prohibition Restriction and Regulation) Act 2022 — came into effect on November 1, 2022.

“The currency of that Act is from 2022 onwards, it does not have retrospective effect. The indictment which has been preferred, in this matter which the Crown is proceeding on, speaks to incidents between August of 2017 through to September of 2022. In those circumstances the appropriate Act in relation to firearms and any material touching and concerning ballistics reports is the Firearms Act of 1967 which has currency from that date up to when it was repealed,” he countered.

But Hinson, in doggedly holding on, further argued that the Crown “has not been compliant with the case management orders made prior to this trial, in particular where it concerns disclosure”.

“The protocols have not been followed… it’s a bit unfortunate that the Crown is holding so firm on its position and urging the court to accede to its application which itself has not complied with the directions clearly set out as to how disclosure ought to be done,” she said while maintaining that the section of the Act being relied on does not contemplate serving documents electronically.

In support of the submissions, defence attorney Tamika Harris pointed out that the legislation says “notice must be served on the accused personally”.

“While service on the counsel through electronic means may be acceptable in the civil arena, I am suggesting in light of the fact that counsel is in court from 10:00 am to 4:00 pm, the accused are in court from 10:00 to 4:00 most days [and are taken back to where they are housed after]. They would not get the opportunity to see these documents and give us instructions. Realistically, serving us electronically does not compute to serving the accused men in three days,” she declared.

Defence attorney John Clarke carried the point further.

“We have a Firearms Act which imposes an obligation on the Crown to serve a written notice and specifically upon the person charged,” he said.

That elicited a swift remark from the sitting judge.

“So on whose behalf are you addressing me now, Counsel? Is it on your own behalf or on behalf of someone? Because if that is to follow, I wonder about the standing of counsel at all. Because if service on counsel is not service on the accused, then could submissions made by counsel be those of the accused?” Justice Palmer asked.

The legal sparring intensified.

“That is a very pointed question. But as the court appreciates when we speak about interpretation when specific legislation of Parliament indicates to the court the manner in which certain things [are] done, we would humbly submit that unless that specific legislation expressly explains,” Clarke replied.

Justice Palmer was up to the challenge.

“If what Counsel is saying [is so], the way we have practised law all over the world must now change? Because is it that Counsel is now saying that service of any documents on Counsel is not service on the accused person? Don’t get me wrong, I understand your submission. I’m just saying I would love to have the benefit of any legal authority anywhere that supports that position, because the same position has been articulated repeatedly this afternoon, so we have gone over that submission.”

Clarke in responding suggested that the court consult the law books and form its own opinion, but he was clear about his views on the matter.

“The court will have to look within the legislation itself, to answer the specific question. We will humbly submit that section 46 (a) does not contemplate electronic service. We have Parliament indicating that this notice, must be served in a certain manner,” he said.

According to Clarke, if the court oversteps this directive, it opens the doors for grounds for the accused to argue in an appeal that they did not see those notices.

“That interpretation, the logical conclusion to that argument, is that the objection which was filed by Counsel Mr Clarke ought to have been prepared and filed by the accused himself; that interpretation leads to significant absurdity,” the senior prosecutor retorted bitingly.

Justice Palmer is to rule on the application when the matter resumes at 10:00 am.