Dear Editor,

Reference is made to a recent publication on Sunday, January 4, 2026 in which there was an analysis of the common law adversarial and civil law inquisitorial legal systems. This analysis was presented by our own Jamaican and celebrated jurist, the former judge of the International Court of Justice, Patrick Robinson.

The legal acumen of this jurist is, by any measure, impressive. However, for him to conclude in his analysis that it should not be possible for the Court of Appeal to overturn a decision of the chief justice is, quite frankly, a misstep. It is an abomination to any democratic State that adheres to the tenets of an independent judiciary.

Justice Robinson’s position was no doubt influenced by the recent decision of our Court of Appeal in the case of Stephenson (Conroy) v R [2025] JM Crim 29. In that case the Court of Appeal overturned a murder conviction based on the chief justice’s approach in the case. Whether one is inclined to agree or disagree with the decision of the Court of Appeal, it represents an instance of a kind of “peer review” which is applied in other professional discipline geared towards accuracy in treating with any subject matter.

Therefore, to argue as Justice Robinson did, that we must put an end to “the legal oddity of the possibility of a decision of the Chief Justice being overturned by the Court of Appeal” on the basis that the chief justice is chief among all judges, including those in the Court of Appeal, cannot serve as a valid premise to advance such a position.

While the Judicature (Appellate Jurisdiction) Act allows the chief justice to be a member of any panel of the Court of Appeal, Section 3(1)(b) of the Act provides that he shall not sit in such a Court unless there are at least four other judges sitting, and unless he has been invited to sit by the president of that Court. The wording of this provision clearly affirms the independence of that Court vis-à-vis the powers and office of the chief justice.

The effect of Justice Robinson’s argument would make any decision of the chief justice immune from review. In this regard, it is perhaps timely to recall the dicta of Lord Atkin in Ambard v Attorney General for Trinidad and Tobago [1936] 1 All ER 704:

“Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful comments of ordinary men.”

This dicta, I respectfully suggest, still rings true, and is of universal application to a healthy, vibrant, and independent judiciary in its purest form.

Peter Champagnie

King’s counsel

peter.champagnie@gmail.com