This is an edited version of a presentation made by Professor Stephen Vasciannie at the Mico launch of the book, “

“Uncle Time is a ole, ole man,All year long ‘im wash ‘im foot in de sea.”Independent Jamaica, unlike Uncle Time, is young, young. Accordingly, to follow Dennis Scott’s imagery, and his logic, we ought not to spend all our time foot-washing. Rather, we need to take our history, analyse it, apply it to our present realities, and use it as the basis for projection into a promising tomorrow. For us, the past must be prologue; it must set the stage for the present and the future. But the past must not confine us to limited possibilities, and in some respects we must work consciously to move away from the challenges of the past. So, of course, we must note the directions prompted from the past — we must always be mindful of what is happening in the rear view mirror. But, even more importantly, we must be mindful of where we are going as a people, and where we wish to go.The use of history as a guide for signposts to the future is a major task for our policymakers, civil servants, civil society members (who, by definition are not civil servants), the private sector, and academics. From that last-mentioned category, the academics, Edwin Jones, distinguished professor at the Mico University College, and professor emeritus of the University of the West Indies, has come forth, armed with an outstanding book, which analyses the past, discusses the present, and offers insights and solutions for the future.In this book, Contending with Administrivia: Competition for Space, Benefits and Power, Professor Jones takes us on a tour of the Jamaican world of public sector management. In its five magisterial chapters, Contending with Administrivia assesses the factors that have influenced, and continue to influence, Jamaica’s efforts to build suitable public institutions against the background of history, as well as difficult modern-day social, political and economic pressures.Many of these pressures are internally generated, and find their origins in structures, institutions and cultural attitudes inherited from the colonial past. But others come, not from within, but from without: there are international factors, prevalent in today’s globalised community, that both hamper and promote the development of Jamaica’s public sector and initiatives in that sector.How should the Jamaican State react to such environmental pressures? How do we bring about structural change in the drive for efficiency? And what are the most suitable measures that may reform the system? These are some of the main issues that fall for assessment in Professor Jones’ path-breaking study.The chapter titles for Contending with Administrivia provide guidance. Chapter one is entitled ‘Jamaica’s Administrative Culture and Change: Sermons from Different Pulpits’. As its name suggests, this chapter concerns itself primarily with the pre-existing and existing administrative culture in Jamaica.It identifies the status quo in Jamaica in the area of public sector management; and, having regard to different sources of influence in Jamaica, the chapter also highlights ways in which theoreticians and practically-oriented persons have assessed the Jamaican environment – these may be regarded as sermons coming from different pulpits. Chapter 1, which lays a solid foundation for the rest of the book, reminds us of the nature of the colonial civil service and its implications. The colonial administrative culture emphasised stability and order, was notably hierarchical, with class, race and colour being important determinants of one’s position within the hierarchy, and relied heavily on respect and loyalty to superiors. It was “elitist in cultural tone”, alienated bureaucrats from most other people, and was given over, in some measure, to patronage and nepotism. It also had a heavy dose of what Professor Jones calls “departmentalism”: government was divided up into departments which allocated responsibilities to different persons. This detracted from coherency in the delivery of social services to the people of Jamaica.In the colonial period, there were countervailing influences; in this regard, Jones highlights the plantation bureaucracy, family-owned business structures and certain community-based organisations. Sometimes these institutions worked to reinforce colonial attitudes and structures in the public sector. For example, both the colonial administrative culture and the plantation bureaucracy were “ideologically inclined” toward authoritarianism, centralisation, and white supremacy. Similarly, family-owned businesses, in Jones’ opinion, tended to conservatism in their attitudes, a tendency which was also discernible within the colonial administrative culture.At other times, however, the structures of Jamaican society would pull away from the prevailing ethos of the colonial civil service. This is true, for example, with respect to aspects of the work of some community-based organisations. For Jones, a defining feature of community-based organisations is that they rely on “culturally relevant, home-grown institutional methods and practices to recognise and solve social problems (p 15).” Thus, the partner system, practised in Jamaica since Emancipation, reflected collective action designed to circumvent economic challenges faced by many Jamaicans.Some of the historical factors influencing the colonial administrative culture remain in place today, but there are postcolonial influences as well. In this regard, Chapter one also reminds us about the impact of international development partners on the domestic environment both today and in the recent past.Since the 1970s, various international institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and various transnational corporations have, with varying degrees of determination, promoted smaller government, with greater flexibility, less rigid hierarchies, and greater transparency. They have also encouraged reform measures that promote enhanced competitiveness and entrepreneurial initiatives. These initiatives, combined with other efforts to promote New Public Management objectives in Jamaica, have influenced the reform agenda in the Jamaican civil service. These, too, may be regarded as sermons coming from different pulpits.Chapter two is entitled “Westminster-Type Model and the Jamaican Political Imaginary”. This Chapter provides a thought-provoking review of the Westminster-Whitehall system of government as applied in the United Kingdom, and assesses issues that have arisen in Jamaica, a country which has sought to replicate that system here, through the so-called Westminster Export Model. Jamaica was probably not compelled to accept the transfer or transplant of the Westminster-Whitehall system into our postcolonial administrative arrangements. So, the question arises, why did we try to accept this system almost lock, stock and barrel?Professor Jones explains, in authoritative terms, Jamaica’s decision to adopt the Westminster system at the time of Independence. In the first place, because Jamaica had been a British colony for more than 300 years, we were, in effect, well-schooled in the workings of that system. Secondly, the British were skilled in symbolic manipulation and in co-opting Jamaican bureaucrats, so the Jamaicans became willing participants in the Westminster arrangements. In this regard, one recalls the important work by Professor Jones’ former colleague in the Department of Government at the UWI, Louis Lindsay, on the nature of symbolic manipulation by the colonial power. Thirdly (although Jones does not press this as a discreet point), Jamaicans have a “strong … predisposition to imitate.”Fourthly, Jamaicans had developed loyalty to, and affection for, the British model, and had not spent much time considering alternatives. Fifthly, relying on perspectives of Professor Subramaniam, Jones suggests that Jamaicans and other former colonial people accepted the Westminster model as a way of demonstrating (contra the British view) that we could master and effectively run the Westminster-Whitehall system.The sixth factor identified by Jones is perhaps the most important to him. It is that the Jamaican middle class, at the time of Independence, was characteristically “derivative, imitative, lopsided and frustrated” (p 57). This class, with these dominant features, led our nationalist movement, assumed the reins of power post-independence, and was keen to replicate Westminster in Jamaica.But, has the Westminster-Whitehall system worked as an administrative and political model in Jamaica? In answering this question, Professor Jones emphasises some of the features of the Westminster-Whitehall model in its original, British form. He notes that the original model is buttressed by stability, flexibility, and a strong base of independent public opinion. This makes the system accountable, and allows the search for pragmatic solutions as well as experiments in government. The original model is also reinforced by an essentially robust British economy as well as a high degree of social capital within a politically homogenous environment.The Jamaican environment is different from that of the British, and this tends to highlight inadequacies in the transplanted model. In Jamaica, Jones posits, the Westminster system has not been fully internalised by the populace, and there are cultural differences that tend to weaken the effectiveness of the system here. More particularly, there is a comparatively low level of trust among Jamaicans, the country is relatively small, and it has faced well-known economic challenges since Independence.As a consequence of the peculiar features of Jamaica, then, the Westminster system has led, in several cases, to the partisan distribution of scarce resources. It has also led to the entrenchment of the politics of symbolic manipulation, by virtue of which the vast majority of people are deceived by political pledges and promises that remain unfulfilled. As part of the process of symbolic manipulation, too, the Westminster Export model has led to numerous commissions of enquiry that, often in the end, lead to nothing.In light of the low performance rating of Westminster in Jamaica (and elsewhere), the system has been subject to criticism and scrutiny. And yet, reform has been slow in coming. There would seem to be two main approaches to reform. One concentrates on streamlining and making more effective the operations of the State, through the introduction of modern methods of public administration.The other operates at the constitutional level, and embraces items that have long been on the Jamaican political agenda. Among other things, these items include: “transformation of the whole administrative architecture; a search for real sovereignty by replacement of the Queen as head of state, alongside substitution of the Caribbean Court of Justice for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as Jamaica’s final court of appeal; completely re-writing the Charter of Fundamental Rights and imposing stronger parliamentary oversight of the executive (p. 68).” Chapter 3 of the book, “Let Them Eat Reform” takes up the theme of the weaknesses of the Jamaican administrative state, and discusses elements of capacity-building, capacity-development, and capacity-destruction, against this background of weakness. The Chapter notes different efforts undertaken over the years to promote capacity building, including technical assistance packages and application of new perspectives in public sector management especially since the 1990s. But these reform efforts in the area of public administration have not always been successful, and, as noted above, more fundamental constitutional change has been slow in coming. Professor Jones places the reform debate in its social context in Jamaica, provides a substantial review of the literature bearing on this issue, and points to a variety of lessons learnt in this area.Chapter 4, on “’The Advisory State’ in Jamaica” begins with a personal note from the author. Professor Jones indicates, inter alia,“Except for short intervals I have served as special adviser to several ministers in Jamaica since 1974. I view the task as complex, challenging and risky. Advice, however, is not decision making. Normally the response to political advice is an admixture of orientations of acceptance, resistance, negotiation, adaptation and mostly ambivalence. Crises are the main propellant of rapid political decision making (p. 114).”On that unambiguous foundation, and with a strong line of pragmatism, Professor Jones analyzes the advent of the political adviser in the Westminster system, points to the rationale for reliance on advisors from outside the career civil service, and measures up some of the responses to the advent of the advisory system. He suggests that the change to greater reliance on political advisors has been prompted by political ideology and by administrative necessity, but notes that the matter of costs for political advisors is always a controversial one in Jamaica’s political context.The book closes with Chapter 5, on “Local Governance in Jamaica: Networking the Commons.” In brief, this chapter examines the values of local democracy, and offers support for “bottom-up” approaches to some aspects of government, both in the abstract and in the particular case of Jamaica.Yesterday, as I was thinking about my perspectives on Professor Jones’ book, and reflecting on its relevance, the following occurred:n Someone sent me an e-mail message seeking my views on the acceptance of the Caribbean Court of Justice. I recalled that the debate on this administrative and judicial change has been relatively hot in the Caribbean for more than 25 years. From the 1990s, the West Indian Commission complained that we cannot forever, like characters in a Chekhov play, rearrange chairs around the table, without taking real steps to introduce the new court for all Caribbean States. I was thus reminded of the accuracy of Professor Jones’ perceptions on the slowness of administrative change in Jamaica.n The Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister was on “Nationwide” radio at about 5:30 p.m. explaining why certain reports from the Integrity Commission had not been filed from her Office to the Jamaican Parliament, as required by law. The Permanent Secretary pointed out that there was an “administrative error”, and therefore the obligation was not satisfied. She offered the assurance that this would not happen again. In partial response to this, Delroy Chuck MP, a former speaker of the House offered that there are numerous instances of administrative error which have a serious negative impact on government business.n In yesterday’s Jamaica Observer, there was a report indicating that the Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, another Westminister, postcolonial Caribbean country, had lost its voting rights at the United Nations General Assembly owing to its failure to make the necessary dues payments. The Vincentian Ambassador said the country had fallen into arrears owing to “a clerical error”, and that it would be corrected with alacrity. The Ambassador added that the issue was “much ado about nothing.”n Recently, too, the Gleaner juxtaposed Professor Anthony Harriott, another former denizen of the Department of Government, against Commissioner of Police Dr Carl Williams. The former was quoted as saying that “over-reliance on extradition is not good” while the latter countered that extradition has been used successfully to crush some of the country’s most dangerous drug syndicates. So, the Professor is concerned about the State’s administrative capacity while the Commissioner implicitly accepts that we have these administrative limits, but argues that we must get on with the work of the State, with foreign assistance if necessary. For the record, I firmly support the Commissioner’s perspective, although I understand the logic of Professor Harriott’s viewpoint.So, in one day, through three or four different media — e-mail, radio, Observer and Gleaner — issues concerning public sector management were lead items in the news. And I daresay, this happens almost every day in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean. This happens both during the “election season” and outside that period. It happens:(1) whenever we talk about corruption, or the perception of it,(2) whenever political leaders complain privately about their inability to have the civil service carry out policy instructions,(3) whenever civil servants fail to provide basic services to the public,(4) whenever political leaders disregard clear rules of law or procedure,(5) whenever there are discussions about the treatment of civil servants, in terms of salary and pension rights,(6) and it happens whenever members of the bureaucracy – including the police, the hospitals, the schools, the guardians at Children’s Homes, and persons in all public institutions — fail to reach requisite levels of efficiency.These are not issues of trivia or administrivia. They are not “much ado about nothing.” They go to issues of quality, social services and in some cases life and death. I am thankful to Professor Jones for inviting me to take part in this event today, and I congratulate him wholeheartedly on his wonderful book written with style, precision and conviction: “Contending with Administrivia” is a publication for all persons interested in Jamaican development.

In his famous poem, Uncle Time, Dennis Scott reminded us that:

“Uncle Time is a ole, ole man,

All year long ‘im wash ‘im foot in de sea.”

Independent Jamaica, unlike Uncle Time, is young, young. Accordingly, to follow Dennis Scott’s imagery, and his logic, we ought not to spend all our time foot-washing. Rather, we need to take our history, analyse it, apply it to our present realities, and use it as the basis for projection into a promising tomorrow.

THE ROLE OF HISTORY

For us, the past must be prologue; it must set the stage for the present and the future. But the past must not confine us to limited possibilities, and in some respects we must work consciously to move away from the challenges of the past.

So, of course, we must note the directions prompted from the past — we must always be mindful of what is happening in the rear view mirror. But, even more importantly, we must be mindful of where we are going as a people, and where we wish to go.

The use of history as a guide for signposts to the future is a major task for our policymakers, civil servants, civil society members (who, by definition are not civil servants), the private sector, and academics.

From that last-mentioned category, the academics, Edwin Jones, distinguished professor at the Mico University College, and professor emeritus of the University of the West Indies, has come forth, armed with an outstanding book, which analyses the past, discusses the present, and offers insights and solutions for the future.

PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT

In this book, Contending with Administrivia: Competition for Space, Benefits and Power, Professor Jones takes us on a tour of the Jamaican world of public sector management.

In its five magisterial chapters, Contending with Administrivia assesses the factors that have influenced, and continue to influence, Jamaica’s efforts to build suitable public institutions against the background of history, as well as difficult modern-day social, political and economic pressures.

Many of these pressures are internally generated, and find their origins in structures, institutions and cultural attitudes inherited from the colonial past. But others come, not from within, but from without: there are international factors, prevalent in today’s globalised community, that both hamper and promote the development of Jamaica’s public sector and initiatives in that sector.

How should the Jamaican State react to such environmental pressures? How do we bring about structural change in the drive for efficiency? And what are the most suitable measures that may reform the system? These are some of the main issues that fall for assessment in Professor Jones’ path-breaking study.

COLONIAL CULTURE

The chapter titles for Contending with Administrivia provide guidance. Chapter one is entitled ‘Jamaica’s Administrative Culture and Change: Sermons from Different Pulpits’. As its name suggests, this chapter concerns itself primarily with the pre-existing and existing administrative culture in Jamaica.

It identifies the status quo in Jamaica in the area of public sector management; and, having regard to different sources of influence in Jamaica, the chapter also highlights ways in which theoreticians and practically-oriented persons have assessed the Jamaican environment – these may be regarded as sermons coming from different pulpits.

Chapter 1, which lays a solid foundation for the rest of the book, reminds us of the nature of the colonial civil service and its implications. The colonial administrative culture emphasised stability and order, was notably hierarchical, with class, race and colour being important determinants of one’s position within the hierarchy, and relied heavily on respect and loyalty to superiors.

It was “elitist in cultural tone”, alienated bureaucrats from most other people, and was given over, in some measure, to patronage and nepotism. It also had a heavy dose of what Professor Jones calls “departmentalism”: government was divided up into departments which allocated responsibilities to different persons. This detracted from coherency in the delivery of social services to the people of Jamaica.

COUNTERVAILING INFLUENCES

In the colonial period, there were countervailing influences; in this regard, Jones highlights the plantation bureaucracy, family-owned business structures and certain community-based organisations. Sometimes these institutions worked to reinforce colonial attitudes and structures in the public sector.

For example, both the colonial administrative culture and the plantation bureaucracy were “ideologically inclined” toward authoritarianism, centralisation, and white supremacy. Similarly, family-owned businesses, in Jones’ opinion, tended to conservatism in their attitudes, a tendency which was also discernible within the colonial administrative culture.

At other times, however, the structures of Jamaican society would pull away from the prevailing ethos of the colonial civil service. This is true, for example, with respect to aspects of the work of some community-based organisations.

For Jones, a defining feature of community-based organisations is that they rely on “culturally relevant, home-grown institutional methods and practices to recognise and solve social problems (p 15).” Thus, the partner system, practised in Jamaica since Emancipation, reflected collective action designed to circumvent economic challenges faced by many Jamaicans.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

Some of the historical factors influencing the colonial administrative culture remain in place today, but there are postcolonial influences as well. In this regard, Chapter one also reminds us about the impact of international development partners on the domestic environment both today and in the recent past.

Since the 1970s, various international institutions, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and various transnational corporations have, with varying degrees of determination, promoted smaller government, with greater flexibility, less rigid hierarchies, and greater transparency.

They have also encouraged reform measures that promote enhanced competitiveness and entrepreneurial initiatives. These initiatives, combined with other efforts to promote New Public Management objectives in Jamaica, have influenced the reform agenda in the Jamaican civil service. These, too, may be regarded as sermons coming from different pulpits.

WHY WESTMINSTER?

Chapter two is entitled “Westminster-Type Model and the Jamaican Political Imaginary”. This Chapter provides a thought-provoking review of the Westminster-Whitehall system of government as applied in the United Kingdom, and assesses issues that have arisen in Jamaica, a country which has sought to replicate that system here, through the so-called Westminster Export Model.

Jamaica was probably not compelled to accept the transfer or transplant of the Westminster-Whitehall system into our postcolonial administrative arrangements. So, the question arises, why did we try to accept this system almost lock, stock and barrel?

Professor Jones explains, in authoritative terms, Jamaica’s decision to adopt the Westminster system at the time of Independence.

In the first place, because Jamaica had been a British colony for more than 300 years, we were, in effect, well-schooled in the workings of that system.

Secondly, the British were skilled in symbolic manipulation and in co-opting Jamaican bureaucrats, so the Jamaicans became willing participants in the Westminster arrangements. In this regard, one recalls the important work by Professor Jones’ former colleague in the Department of Government at the UWI, Louis Lindsay, on the nature of symbolic manipulation by the colonial power.

Thirdly (although Jones does not press this as a discreet point), Jamaicans have a “strong … predisposition to imitate.”

Fourthly, Jamaicans had developed loyalty to, and affection for, the British model, and had not spent much time considering alternatives.

Fifthly, relying on perspectives of Professor Subramaniam, Jones suggests that Jamaicans and other former colonial people accepted the Westminster model as a way of demonstrating (contra the British view) that we could master and effectively run the Westminster-Whitehall system.

The sixth factor identified by Jones is perhaps the most important to him. It is that the Jamaican middle class, at the time of Independence, was characteristically “derivative, imitative, lopsided and frustrated” (p 57). This class, with these dominant features, led our nationalist movement, assumed the reins of power post-independence, and was keen to replicate Westminster in Jamaica.

HAS WESTMINSTER WORKED?

But, has the Westminster-Whitehall system worked as an administrative and political model in Jamaica? In answering this question, Professor Jones emphasises some of the features of the Westminster-Whitehall model in its original, British form.

He notes that the original model is buttressed by stability, flexibility, and a strong base of independent public opinion. This makes the system accountable, and allows the search for pragmatic solutions as well as experiments in government. The original model is also reinforced by an essentially robust British economy as well as a high degree of social capital within a politically homogenous environment.

The Jamaican environment is different from that of the British, and this tends to highlight inadequacies in the transplanted model. In Jamaica, Jones posits, the Westminster system has not been fully internalised by the populace, and there are cultural differences that tend to weaken the effectiveness of the system here.

More particularly, there is a comparatively low level of trust among Jamaicans, the country is relatively small, and it has faced well-known economic challenges since Independence.

As a consequence of the peculiar features of Jamaica, then, the Westminster system has led, in several cases, to the partisan distribution of scarce resources. It has also led to the entrenchment of the politics of symbolic manipulation, by virtue of which the vast majority of people are deceived by political pledges and promises that remain unfulfilled.

As part of the process of symbolic manipulation, too, the Westminster Export model has led to numerous commissions of enquiry that, often in the end, lead to nothing.

REFORM NEEDED

In light of the low performance rating of Westminster in Jamaica (and elsewhere), the system has been subject to criticism and scrutiny. And yet, reform has been slow in coming. There would seem to be two main approaches to reform. One concentrates on streamlining and making more effective the operations of the State, through the introduction of modern methods of public administration.

The other operates at the constitutional level, and embraces items that have long been on the Jamaican political agenda. Among other things, these items include:

“transformation of the whole administrative architecture; a search for real sovereignty by replacement of the Queen as head of state, alongside substitution of the Caribbean Court of Justice for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as Jamaica’s final court of appeal; completely re-writing the Charter of Fundamental Rights and imposing stronger parliamentary oversight of the executive (p. 68).”

EATING REFORM

Chapter 3 of the book, “Let Them Eat Reform” takes up the theme of the weaknesses of the Jamaican administrative state, and discusses elements of capacity-building, capacity-development, and capacity-destruction, against this background of weakness.

The Chapter notes different efforts undertaken over the years to promote capacity building, including technical assistance packages and application of new perspectives in public sector management especially since the 1990s.

But these reform efforts in the area of public administration have not always been successful, and, as noted above, more fundamental constitutional change has been slow in coming. Professor Jones places the reform debate in its social context in Jamaica, provides a substantial review of the literature bearing on this issue, and points to a variety of lessons learnt in this area.

POLITICAL ADVISORS

Chapter 4, on “’The Advisory State’ in Jamaica” begins with a personal note from the author. Professor Jones indicates, inter alia,

“Except for short intervals I have served as special adviser to several ministers in Jamaica since 1974. I view the task as complex, challenging and risky. Advice, however, is not decision making. Normally the response to political advice is an admixture of orientations of acceptance, resistance, negotiation, adaptation and mostly ambivalence. Crises are the main propellant of rapid political decision making (p. 114).”

On that unambiguous foundation, and with a strong line of pragmatism, Professor Jones analyzes the advent of the political adviser in the Westminster system, points to the rationale for reliance on advisors from outside the career civil service, and measures up some of the responses to the advent of the advisory system.

He suggests that the change to greater reliance on political advisors has been prompted by political ideology and by administrative necessity, but notes that the matter of costs for political advisors is always a controversial one in Jamaica’s political context.

The book closes with Chapter 5, on “Local Governance in Jamaica: Networking the Commons.” In brief, this chapter examines the values of local democracy, and offers support for “bottom-up” approaches to some aspects of government, both in the abstract and in the particular case of Jamaica.

IMMEDIATE RELEVANCE

Yesterday, as I was thinking about my perspectives on Professor Jones’ book, and reflecting on its relevance, the following occurred:

n Someone sent me an e-mail message seeking my views on the acceptance of the Caribbean Court of Justice. I recalled that the debate on this administrative and judicial change has been relatively hot in the Caribbean for more than 25 years. From the 1990s, the West Indian Commission complained that we cannot forever, like characters in a Chekhov play, rearrange chairs around the table, without taking real steps to introduce the new court for all Caribbean States. I was thus reminded of the accuracy of Professor Jones’ perceptions on the slowness of administrative change in Jamaica.

“ERRORS”

n The Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister was on “Nationwide” radio at about 5:30 p.m. explaining why certain reports from the Integrity Commission had not been filed from her Office to the Jamaican Parliament, as required by law. The Permanent Secretary pointed out that there was an “administrative error”, and therefore the obligation was not satisfied. She offered the assurance that this would not happen again. In partial response to this, Delroy Chuck MP, a former speaker of the House offered that there are numerous instances of administrative error which have a serious negative impact on government business.

n In yesterday’s Jamaica Observer, there was a report indicating that the Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, another Westminister, postcolonial Caribbean country, had lost its voting rights at the United Nations General Assembly owing to its failure to make the necessary dues payments. The Vincentian Ambassador said the country had fallen into arrears owing to “a clerical error”, and that it would be corrected with alacrity. The Ambassador added that the issue was “much ado about nothing.”

EXTRADITION EXCHANGE

n Recently, too, the Gleaner juxtaposed Professor Anthony Harriott, another former denizen of the Department of Government, against Commissioner of Police Dr Carl Williams. The former was quoted as saying that “over-reliance on extradition is not good” while the latter countered that extradition has been used successfully to crush some of the country’s most dangerous drug syndicates. So, the Professor is concerned about the State’s administrative capacity while the Commissioner implicitly accepts that we have these administrative limits, but argues that we must get on with the work of the State, with foreign assistance if necessary. For the record, I firmly support the Commissioner’s perspective, although I understand the logic of Professor Harriott’s viewpoint.

SIGNIFICANCE

So, in one day, through three or four different media — e-mail, radio, Observer and Gleaner — issues concerning public sector management were lead items in the news. And I daresay, this happens almost every day in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean.

This happens both during the “election season” and outside that period. It happens:

(1) whenever we talk about corruption, or the perception of it,

(2) whenever political leaders complain privately about their inability to have the civil service carry out policy instructions,

(3) whenever civil servants fail to provide basic services to the public,

(4) whenever political leaders disregard clear rules of law or procedure,

(5) whenever there are discussions about the treatment of civil servants, in terms of salary and pension rights,

(6) and it happens whenever members of the bureaucracy – including the police, the hospitals, the schools, the guardians at Children’s Homes, and persons in all public institutions — fail to reach requisite levels of efficiency.

These are not issues of trivia or administrivia. They are not “much ado about nothing.” They go to issues of quality, social services and in some cases life and death.

I am thankful to Professor Jones for inviting me to take part in this event today, and I congratulate him wholeheartedly on his wonderful book written with style, precision and conviction: “Contending with Administrivia” is a publication for all persons interested in Jamaican development.