Essentially , 1978 marked the beginning of the end for the People’s National Party’s (PNP) popularity. Even so, the PNP had its eyes set on winning yet a third term in 1980, and in convincing style. Mark you, winning a third term was a near impossibility at the time because of the country’s two-term rotational voting pattern. Still, the Comrades held high hopes of completing its 1972 holistic “Better must come” development agenda.

That aside, there is no better way to introduce the culmination of years of horrifying levels of political violence, foreign interference, sabotage, economic instability, and social degeneration in 1980 than with, the first stanza from W B Yates’s The Second Coming: “Turning and turning in the widening gyre, the falcon cannot hear the falconer; things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, the blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere. The ceremony of innocence is drowned; the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity…”

Never again must any political leader take the liberty to threaten to “lock down the country tighter than a sardine can that not even rain can fall”. The malicious socio-political and economic maladies had to end. Jamaica was on the brink of becoming a failed State, like that which the Tonton Macoute made of Haiti under François “Papa Doc” Duvalier. Fortuitously, Norman Manley might have been intuitively prescient when he warned Jamaicans of a strange foreign “political culture” — a phenomenon of wretched political violence.

Frankly, there is no victory so necessary, no battle so deserving, for any political party to encourage and equip passionate followers to kill one another in furtherance of a political goal.

The first time I saw my paternal grandmother, “Ma’ Burns”, cry was in 1980. She could not hold back the tears as news came that my Dad, as well as a few of his friends, had been seriously attacked and injured by supporters of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) during a tour of St Mary East Central, which ended with a spot meeting in Highgate Square. The tour was led by then Opposition Leader Edward Seaga. And, whilst there were unambiguous correlations between the tour and the caravan of anarchy and violence that supervened, we held Seaga harmless. After all, he was not the causal factor for the ugliness that almost cost my dad and his colleagues their lives.

The Michael Manley-led PNP entered the final stretch of that bloody October 30, 1980 election as a substantially weakened political party and Government. It also entered the general election still mourning the brutal assassination of Assistant Minister of National Security Roy McGann, PNP candidate for St Andrew East Rural, along with his bodyguard. Both men were killed by policemen in Gordon Town Square a day before nominations opened. Well over 840 Jamaicans were known to have been killed. As if the socio-economic conditions were not terrible enough, Hurricane Allen also hit Jamaica in August 1980 — a mere two months before that election. The hurricane left a $155 million in destruction in its wake.

In the end, despite Michael Manley’s “150,000 strong can’t be wrong” assertion — used to describe the massive PNP crowd that had gathered in Sam Sharpe before the election — the general election ended in a stunning but expected victory for the JLP. In candid terms, the PNP got its clock cleaned. Its “Stand firm, we are fighting for a cause…” slogan was no match to the JLP’s well-marketed, super-targeted, efficiently executed “Deliverance” mantra, in addition to the enticing catchphrase that promised “money going to jingle inna yuh pocket”. At the final counting of the ballots, the Edward Seaga-led JLP won 51 seats, to nine for the PNP. It was a record margin of victory by any political party up to the time. Put another way, the 1980 election was a “change” election. As such, the JLP won with 58.89 per cent of the popular votes to the PNP’s 41.05 per cent (a near 18 per cent advantage). The other 0.06 per cent went to the seven independent candidates who participated.

That 1980 victory was as much pyrrhic as it was liberating. Pyrrhic because, for all that happened before, during, and after that bloody period in Jamaica’s political history, the victory was offset by staggering losses. For, as the original speaker, Pyrrhus of Epirus, said after defeating the Romans at Asculum, “Another such victory and we are lost.” The win was liberating because, with it, came political calm, social order, and a desire to reject the Tonton Macoute strange foreign “political culture” — a phenomenon of wretched political violence Norman Manley warned about.

Seaga had already made it clear that he inherited a country that was “…lurching from crisis to crisis…” To compensate for that promise, the Government maintained a veneer of prosperity throughout much of its tenure. Let me be abundantly clear, lest some political sycophant jump all over me, the Seaga-led JLP Government accomplished some significant gains for the Jamaican people. His Government, more than any other, had little or no honeymoon. Its only choice in 1980 was to get the ball rolling, and it did so in the most level-headed and focused way, given the challenging circumstances.

To begin with, and from the very outset, the Seaga-led JLP Government faced many of the same headwinds that the previous PNP Government faced during much of its tenure. The JLP inherited an economy with negative 5.7 per cent gross domestic product (GDP) growth, an external debt of 80 per cent of gross national income (GNI), and unemployment rate of about 27 per cent compared to a 24 per cent unemployment rate in 1972 when Manley came to power. It was not only Manley who faced “batteration” from Middle East oil crisis; though substantially less impactful, the Seaga-led JLP Government also faced an Iran oil embargo.

Under that embargo, oil prices moved from a high of US$35.63 per barrel in 1980 to a high of US$39.00, or a 9.45 per cent increase in 1981. In the 1973 situation, and according to the US Energy Information Administration, oil prices moved from an average of US$4.08 per barrel in 1973 to a high of US$35.63, or about a 773 per cent increase by 1980. It was no wonder that the inflation rate jumped from 5.4 per cent in 1972 to a significant 27 per cent by 1980. The new Seaga Government also faced urgent spending in the aftermath of Hurricane Allen. Additionally, and like Manley’s experience, between 1980 to 1985, Jamaican bauxite/alumina production was cut in half. As a result, foreign exchange earnings fell from US$353.3 million to $125.1 million.

But, unlike its predecessor, the JLP also inherited a country in 1980 with an infant mortality rate of 33 per 1,000 versus the 41 per 1,000 the PNP inherited in 1972. Surprisingly, too, and according to the World Bank, the JLP inherited a country in 1980 with a per capita GDP, at current US dollar, of US$1,239 versus a per capita GDP of US$989 in 1972. Very few people know of that 28 per cent increase in per capita GDP under the PNP. The JLP also inherited GDP value, at current US dollar, of US$2.69 billion in 1980 versus GDP value, at current US dollar, of US$1.88 billion, or a 43 per cent increase compared to 1972.

Again, and for strict context, unlike what Manley faced with the 773 per cent increase in oil prices between 1973 to 1980, the increase in oil prices under Seaga was short-lived and coincided with the conclusion of the US recession. Based on information from the US Energy Administration, after that 1981 9.45 per cent spike, oil prices declined annually and settled at a high of US$15.93 per barrel by 1988, or a 124 per cent per barrel reduction versus US$35.63 per barrel in 1980. In fact, in a single act, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased oil supply in 1987, the additional supply pushed oil prices from a high of US$24.93 per barrel in 1986 to a high of US$19.32 per barrel in 1987.

Seaga’s October 30, 1980 election victory was not without histrionics or polemics. One of Seaga’s first big acts after taking office was to declare the very popular and active Cuban ambassador, Ulises Estrada, persona non grata. Then, on October 30, 1981, as was widely reported in The New York Times, “Jamaica broke diplomatic relations with Cuba today and ordered the Cuban Embassy here closed within 48 hours. Prime Minister Edward P G Seaga told Parliament that diplomatic ties were cut because Cuba had refused to return three men wanted in Jamaica on murder charges…” Seaga did that just before ending diplomatic relations with Cuba. The real sleight of hand-like drama betrayed the fact that, despite kicking out the ambassador, Seaga deliberately delayed ending diplomatic relations with Castro’s communist Cuba until shortly after previously negotiated tractors had arrived in Jamaica from Cuba. Yuh think Eddie easy?

Freshly minted US President Ronald Reagan went out of his way to reward Seaga’s efforts to realign Jamaica as a key US ally and strategic partner. In that regard, Reagan wasted no time in inviting him as the first foreign head of government to the White House in 1981. Seaga’s borrowing spree began immediately thereafter. Jamaica received unprecedented levels of foreign assistance in the 1980s; the primary lenders were the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The country’s relations with the IMF provided balance of payments support, which helped to encourage investor confidence.

According to IMF data, “With the signing of a US$650-million loan in April 1981, Jamaica became the number one per capita recipient of IMF lending in the world.” The Seaga-led JLP Government signed several more agreements with the fund through 1987. IMF lending, however, came with strict economic policy conditionalities and austerity measures. Jamaica also received generous funding from the World Bank, ranking our country the number one per capita recipient in 1982. As in the case of IMF funding, the structural adjustment loans of the World Bank included economic policy reform conditions. United States bilateral assistance to Jamaica after 1981 was also unprecedented. Between 1981-1985 Jamaica ranked as the second or third per capita recipient of USAID funding.

In 1981 and 1982 alone, Jamaica received more assistance from the United States than it did during the entire previous postwar period. It was estimated that the United States would provide Jamaica with US$1 billion during the 1980s. Most funding went to balance of payments support. Later, under the JLP’s fourth IMF programme, “the economy performed a little better, but that had much to do with the more favourable international economic conditions and a more expansionary economic policy in the build-up to the 1989 election…” The 1980 election settled socio-political tension in the country and that laid the foundation for economic recovery and growth.

According to World Bank figures, GDP per capita moved from US$1,238 in 1980 to US$1,833 in 1989; inflation moved from 27 per cent to 14 per cent, and GDP value moved from US$2.7 billion in 1980 to US$4.4 billion in 1989. Foreign direct investment (FDI) moved from US$0.03 billion in 1980 to US$0.06 billion in 1989. Economic growth moved from negative 5.7 per cent in 1980 to 7 per cent in 1989. The trade balance, as a per cent of GDP, moved from negative 0.82 per cent to negative 8.8 per cent. Unsurprisingly painful, however, was the albatross of debt that the Seaga-led JLP incurred. According to the World Bank, Jamaica’s external debt as a per cent of GDP grew exponentially from 79 per cent in 1980 to a staggering 133 per cent by 1989, but peaked to well over 225 per cent in 1985.

Seaga quickly realised, certainly by the end of 1981, that he had to tame the politics of promise with the introduction of the politics of control. That move was not because he was wicked, but because he had no other choice. What he did with those choices made all the difference. The reality of structural adjustments, austerity, and trade liberalisation began to impact the people negatively. So much so that the pressure triggered a general strike in 1987; even as nurses were laid off, funding to hospitals and schools were cut, civil servants made redundant, basic infrastructure were underfunded as the austerity took root.

Seaga knew as much about the poor man’s struggle as do all other Jamaican leaders before him and after him. He had a social conscience and was resolute in his convictions — wrong or right — but also reasonable. Circa late July 1998, some 18 years removed, Fidel Castro and Edward Seaga put aside old conflicts as they engaged in discussions about their countries’ future as neighbours. It mattered very little to Seaga that he had expelled a Cuban ambassador, and subsequently severed diplomatic ties with Cuba. Instead, Seaga told journalists at a meeting with Castro in Montego Bay, that “…Every conflict has its beginning and its end…We are at the end of that period…We are dealing with the future; we are all in the same boat, searching for the right strategy in development…” Ironically, that was exactly what Michael Manley sought to accomplish during his first tenure as prime minister between 1972-1980.

Christopher Burns is chief finance officer and vice-president of finance for a multinational. Send your comments to the Jamaica Observer or burnscg@aol.

com. the Jamaica Observer or burnscg@aol.com.