For a commercial entity to be successfu, it must produce and deliver goods and/or services in the requisite market efficiently to ensure profitability. The question is, “Was the promotion of live horse racing ever viable in Jamaica? It was, but there were key operatives afflicted with anti-handicapping and anti-bookmaking derangement syndrome touting a tote monopoly and a claiming system, and who, to this day, are unlikely to admit to the failure of this racing product.

In August 1959, local horse racing was ushered into the modern era with the opening of the state-of-the-art Caymanas facility featuring a grandstand and a sand track circuit of nine furlongs and two chutes. This was a far cry from the tent accommodation of Knutsford Park (New Kingston) and its short, undulating grass surface. A totalisator with an electromagnetic system enabling win, place, quiniela and double event betting options with printed tickets was the latest technology.

There were 28 race meetings in 1960, the first full year of the Caymanas operation. A decade later, with the expansion of the racing calendar to include mid-week programmes, by the end of 1992, it had peaked with an average of 115 runners in 11.23 races each race day. This was 300 per cent cumulative growth, driven by the British Horseracing Authority (BHA) Handicap System, where horses of similar ability compete for the tote and bookmaking operations to sustain viability.

In 1992, the influential anti-handicappers and anti-bookmaking conspiracy theorists hatched a plan to adopt the failing United States 1930 Claiming System. This would supposedly be superior to the successful handicap system deployed in the flourishing industries of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany in Europe, as well as many British Commonwealth nations, including South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Hong Kong, with Japan and South Korea also utilising the BHA methodology.

The 1990 installation of the digital tote platform, facilitated by then-Finance Minister Seymour Mullings, increased betting options to eight, making 1992 the most profitable Caymanas annual return ever. Therefore, the decision to abandon the handicapping methodology for the unviable American claiming aberration was established on two false premises.

Firstly and erroneously, it was claimed the local racing product, with a trajectory of spectacular sustained growth, lacked integrity. In any event, it is the Jamaica Racing Commission’s remit to protect the integrity of the racing product, not the misguided and ignorant operatives of a promoting company.

Unsubstantiated claims of race fixing were propagated, but more than 10 bookmaking entities operated viably, which is conclusive evidence that the perpetrators of this alleged corrupt practice were unsuccessful.

Secondly, what was equally misleading and disastrous was the notion that the trading in thoroughbreds was a viable economic activity. Unfortunately for the local racing industry, these two flawed positions, on which conspiracists had based their arguments, held sway, and on January 23, 1993, the existential threat to the local racing industry was launched. Over the 33 years of claiming, more than a few big spenders have been badly burnt and disappeared poorer as a consequence

To keep the promoting company, Caymanas Track Limited, operational until the IMF-mandated divestment in 2017, the governments (PNP/JLP) injected nearly US$40 million in a combination of cash and tax write-offs.

Importantly, the unprofitable racing product has continued to present odds-on favourites to the tune of 389 in 755 races last year and as at July 29 this year, 197 from 433. This is the major contributing factor to the SVREL financial statement of 31-12-24, showing a shortfall of over $385 million in revenue projection.

The failure of the claiming system was patently obvious for the following reasons:

(a) The horse population was divided into 25 categories, up from seven, thus guaranteeing smaller fields, which was exacerbated by the need to project races over short, middle and long distances. This nonsense also reduced the frequency with which the capable horses could compete, leaving all such owners at a potentially expensive disadvantage due to the inevitably longer idle periods in rotation of the distances offered.

(b) In a claiming system, the non-genuine or artificial classification of the horse population renders horses with inferior form, conceding weight to superior ones in all races except the Classics. This generates a high number of odds-on favourites to discourage wagering.

(c) A gaming product thrives on simplicity. However, a claiming system format is anything but, in fact, it is complicated, and this has militated against the growth of the customer base in North and Central America, as well as here in Jamaica.

(d) A claiming system operates in the interest of an elite minority, against the BHA’s advice that the promotion of horse racing must be conducted in the interest of the majority.

(e) Who is the most important operative in horse racing? The supporters of claiming are unaware it is the handicapper, whose competence or the lack thereof has a direct impact on sales turnover positively or negatively. Speed and stamina is related to weight, so the form of the horses must be perceived to be equalised to produce and drive competitive wagering.

(f) The breeding industry was certain to experience a lack of adequate investment.

In part two of this analysis, I will delve further into this matter and examine the SVREL business model. The surviving supporters of claiming can prepare their rebuttal, but I will be surprised if there is a response from any. “Facts are stubborn things” and will survive denial by those existing in the claiming system illusory universe.