Sovereignty is surrendered in contracts, not in legislation — Part 2
In Part 1 I argued that AI sovereignty is not a building full of machines. It rests on four pillars — data, operations, models and infrastructure — and we can hold three. The fourth, the physical compute, we will not hold outright, because advanced chips are made in a handful of facilities overseas and because power does not travel the way bandwidth does.
So how do we secure what we can hold?
The National AI Task Force has published its policy recommendations, Cabinet has accepted them, and the Government of Jamaica has a direction. But direction is not capability. Beyond the Data Protection Act, capability comes from three instruments.
Procurement
If you take one thing from this series, take this. Sovereignty is rarely surrendered in legislation. It goes in contracts. A country can publish a thoughtful AI policy in March and sign the whole thing away in September, in a procurement no minister reads.
The clauses that settle it are dull and specific. Where does processing physically happen? Can we audit the system and see its logs? May the supplier train its products on our data, because unless the contract says no, assume yes. Can we take our data and leave? Whose courts hear the dispute?
A standard set of clauses needs no legislation and could be issued in months. And this belongs on the business desk as much as the policy desk, because every company signing an AI contract faces the same exposure.
The alternative is where governments quietly lose sovereignty while believing they have it. If a public body runs its AI by sending every request to a company’s servers overseas, it does not have sovereign AI. Not partly. The processing happens on somebody else’s machine, under their pricing, their terms and their law.
The rights we already have
Our constitution gives us rights against the State: The right to know why, to be heard, to seek review. Moving a decision into software does not remove them, yet they evaporate unless three obligations are established:
1) that citizens are told an automated system was involved;
2) that it keeps a record of how it reached its conclusion; and
3) that a named officer can overturn it.
Nobody votes to lose those protections. They just disappear by default, one system at a time. Slippery slope.
Institutions and people
A regulator with limited technical staff cannot seriously evaluate a system its vendor has every reason to describe generously, and nothing above works without this. It is my view that countries fail here not for want of a strategy, but because these pieces sit in different ministries and nobody owns the whole.
What the sea decides
Which brings me back to where Part 1 ended. Data can travel to where the power is. Power cannot travel to where the data is.
Once we understand that, the strategy turns on its head. Caricom, with its 23 members, could conceivably end up with 23 national AI data centres, each burning imported fuel. That is not resilience. It is one mistake made 23 times.
What must be contemplated at the regional level is shared standards and contract clauses, so no vendor can play one island against another. Perhaps a shared pool of technical and legal expertise, instead of 23 ministries chasing the same three people. And joint purchasing that turns 23 small markets into one buyer worth taking seriously. (Unfortunately, Caricom never managed a similar strategy with the telecoms sector… but I digress.)
The test
Jamaica has gone further than most of the region: A National AI Task Force with published recommendations, an AI Readiness Assessment Report, a Data Protection Act in force and a Government engaged with the questions. The standard now is not whether we own a building full of machines. It is whether we hold the pillars we can actually hold.
That is the $64-K question, and four smaller ones make it concrete, whether you run a ministry, a bank or a hospital.
1) Where was that decision processed?
2) Who wrote the rules it followed?
3) Who holds the information it used?
4) If that supplier doubled its price tomorrow, could we walk away?
Answer all four while renting your chips and you can answer the sovereignty question. Own the data centre and fail to answer them, and all you have is an expensive building and a very large electricity bill. Our policies must be guided by these considerations. And they will be.
Trevor Forrest is founder and CEO of Lignum Security Limited, a provider of AI-driven cyber-security solutions and consulting services, member of the National AI Task Force, and senior advisor for science, technology and special projects in the Office of the Prime Minister. Email:trevorforrest@lignumsecurity.com