THE Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) lost the December 29 General Election because it became so inebriated by its rabid fascination with the “youth factor” that it failed to demolish the everlasting wall of political inseparability it diligently constructed prior.

And, isn’t it criminally ironic that having spent the last two years dismantling the politics of separability (all this while Emperor Eloquent represented a huge liability) the JLP suddenly woke up to the foolishness of its ways?

In fact, the party was so wedded to the Emperor that JLP MPs, including Andrew Holness, sat in Parliament and with heads uncovered, rejected a reasonable motion of censure brought against the Emperor. And as if that were not disgraceful enough, the JLP’s Central Executive refused his offer to resign and later joined JLP senators in a vulgar expression of support for his handling of the Dudus-Manatt affair.

And while the G2K erred during the election, the JLP’s Politburo was deafeningly silent in disapproving G2K’s behaviour. Therefore, as long knives are drawn let them not be aimed solely at Delano Seiveright, but let the sharpest blades be inward-bound so the entire leadership of the JLP can fall perfectly thereon.

To begin with, no political party can overcome the politics of inseparability if it chooses to replace one toxic political element with an alloy that appears unable and, at times, inexplicably unwilling to fend off the gravitational pull of the contaminated source. Simply put, it is politically suicidal to have a highly charged radioactive political conductor in the same vicinity with, or proximate to, a feeble absorptive resource.

After all, “One bad apple can spoil a whole bunch”. Holness should have positioned himself and campaigned, internally and externally, as his own man and not in the shadows of his political uncle.

This separability was fundamental, given that credibility and believability were central themes in the elections. So when Mr Holness said things that voters found incredible, or when he acted similar to how Emperor Eloquent would have acted, it not only drove up his personal negatives, it also pulled down the party’s positives. Ultimately, it robbed the party of the opportunity to stay on message.

So the JLP lost the election the minute Mr “Young and Different” metamorphosed into the persona of Emperor Eloquent, a character which voters had long rejected and decided to thrust aside. Furthermore, the metamorphosis ran counterintuitively to the overarching strategy to position Holness as the Fresh Prince.

Obviously, the JLP opted for a leader-centric approach, but did so without understanding either the symbiotic or the cause and effect relationship between the party and the leader, or how “leader-negatives” would inexorably increase the party’s unelectability.

Consequently, the decision to pursue an election strategy that was less people-focused and more organisation and leader-centric was an unmitigated disaster. The strategy was predicated on assumptions that were illogical and insensitive; both of which were antithetical to the wishes, expectations and desires of voters, who kept looking to the JLP to put them front and centre of its programmes. Yet, strangely enough, as the JLP strategised on ways to mitigate the Dudus-Manatt curse and to exorcise the ghosts of mendacity, the electorate, having seen too many empty tombs, was unconvinced by the attempts to save face. To them, the “horse had already bolted”.

The party should have known that voters will feign acceptance of political strategies, but know when falsehood is being foisted upon them and how to flex their muscles against deception. So while politicians think cunningness is always a political masterstroke, “hell-pop” when voters disagree.

The JLP’s loss can be attributed to several flaws in its political algorithm; there were too many weak links in its chain. The JLP started out by assuming the position of the drowning man and so, the party was constantly clutching after straws; although there were no straws to clutch. This strategy exposed the holes in the JLP’s bucket as the campaign became more reactive and less proactive.

The JLP’s loss was also a function of its own looseness in messaging, in collaboration, in co-ordination and discipline, in capacity-building, in organisation, and in leadership. There were too many chiefs and too few Indians.

There were moments on the campaign trail when Karl Samuda’s frustration became so evident that any political neophyte could detect it. In the final analysis, though, the JLP grossly miscalculated the supremacy and resilience of the PNP’s election machinery, secretariat, campaign team, enumeration advantage and broad-based acceptance of Portia.

Burnscg@aol.com